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Tax Deductions for Charitable Contributions:
Domestic Activities, Foreign Activities, or
None of the Above
Eric M. Zolt*
Warren Buffett, Bill Gates, and sixty-seven other billionaires have pledged to give a
majority of their wealth for charitable purposes. The total dollar amount of potential
funding for charitable activities is staggering. So is the potential loss of tax revenue.
Because of past, current, and future tax benefits, U.S. taxpayers have funded and will
fund a substantial portion of these charitable activities without any input in how the
money is spent. These billionaires are not just being generous with their own money,
but with the money of the American people.
Should we allow tax benefits to subsidize charitable activities and allow donors to
dictate how funds are spent? This Article seeks to contribute to the debate on the
desirability of charitable tax deductions by focusing on a smaller part of the charitable
tax world: charitable deductions for foreign assistance. Tax benefits for foreign
assistance raise several of the same issues that arise in the purely domestic context, as
well as issues that may be less important or absent in the subsidizing of domestic
charitable activities.
Recent scholarship has argued for continuing to allow tax benefits to foreign charitable
activities, and for extending charitable tax benefits to foreign charities and to for-profit
entities engaged in charitable activities. These arguments rest partly on the notion that
there is no meaningful way to distinguish these activities or entities from domestic
charities engaged in domestic charitable activities. These scholars may be right in
arguing for consistent tax treatment for domestic and foreign charitable activity, but
they may be wrong in their conclusions. The best approach may be to consider changes
to the current charitable-deduction regime for both domestic and foreign charitable
activities and to consider other alternatives for the government to provide financial
support and other incentives for charitable activities.

* Michael H. Schill Distinguished Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.
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Introduction
Linda Evangelista, the Canadian supermodel, once famously noted
that she and fellow supermodel Christy Turlington did not wake up for
1
less than $10,000 a day, then the top rate for going down the catwalk. I
1. Jackie Bolin & David Ninh, Learning Fashionese: You, Too, Can Speak Like a Fashionista,
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admire her candor. Economists refer to this as the “reservation wage”—a
2
useful concept in thinking about the labor-leisure trade-off. I have often
wanted to ask Ms. Evangelista whether the $10,000 was before or after
3
taxes.
4
Warren Buffett, Bill Gates, and sixty-seven other billionaires have
5
pledged to give a majority of their wealth for charitable purposes. Like
many others, I admire their generosity and their willingness to give back
to a society that has helped them achieve their success. And again, I want
to ask these individuals whether the amounts pledged are calculated
before or after taxes. The difference is substantial. Even with the
extended Bush tax cuts and the new estate tax regime, past, current, and
future income, gift, and estate tax benefits may result in tax subsidies
6
between 35–70% of the amounts contributed. A rough calculation for
these sixty-nine billionaires yields a potential loss of tax revenue of over

Dall. Morning News, July 26, 2001, at 1C.
2. See generally Jerry A. Hausman, Taxes and Labor Supply, in 1 Handbook of Public
Economics 213 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 1985).
3. Ms. Evangelista made the comment in 1990, when the combined marginal federal, New York
state, New York City, and payroll tax rate was in excess of 45%, assuming an individual filer in the
maximum tax bracket. E.J. McMahon, Pricing the “Luxury Product”: New York City Taxes Under
Mayor Bloomberg, 47 Civ. Rep., Nov. 2005, at fig.3; History of Federal Individual Income Bottom and
Top Bracket Rates, Nat’l Taxpayers Union, http://www.ntu.org/tax-basics/history-of-federalindividual-1.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2011); N.Y. St. Dep’t of Tax’n & Fin., 1990 New York State
Tax Table for Forms IT-200, IT-201 and IT-203 (1990).
4. Unlike geese, baboons, lions, fish, dogs, whales, ships, and trucks, no collective noun has yet
emerged to describe a group of billionaires. The New Oxford American Dictionary (2001). Perhaps,
a “bevy of billionaires.” Professor Len Burman suggests a “flush of billionaires.” Email from Len
Burman, Professor, Syracuse University, to Eric M. Zolt (Feb. 23, 2011) (on file with the Author).
5. A list of individuals who have taken the Giving Pledge can be found at http://givingpledge.org/
(last visited Dec. 23, 2011). Appendix A, infra, provides a current list of the individuals who pledged
and an estimate of their current wealth.
6. For those donors who realize no income tax benefits from charitable contributions, the tax
subsidy is 35% (the relief from gift and estate tax liability). For donors with substantial income tax
liability, the tax subsidy rate could be over 70%. This estimated tax benefit assumes a federal income
tax rate of 35%, a state income tax rate of 6%, a capital gains rate of 15%, and a federal estate tax rate
of 35%. It also assumes that the donation is funded with appreciated stock with a basis equal to 10%
of the fair market value at the date of contribution. If the charitable gift were made in cash or stock
held until death (thus, not subject to capital gains tax), the subsidy rate is 60%. Both of these examples
also assume that the limits on annual charitable deductions (50% of adjusted gross income for cash
and 30% of adjusted gross income for appreciated stock or, in the case of donations to private
foundations, 30% of adjusted gross income for cash and 20% of adjusted gross income for appreciated
stock) are not applicable.
For many billionaires, the tax savings from charitable contributions will be a smaller percentage
of the amounts contributed because their effective state and federal income tax rates are well below
the maximum statutory rate. IRS data for 2008 for the 400 households with the highest gross income
shows that the effective tax rate for this group (which may or may not reflect those individuals subject
to the pledge) was 18.1% of gross income, as over half of the gains for taxpayers in this group were
from capital gains and dividends that are subject to a maximum tax rate of 15%. IRS, The 400
Individual Income Tax Returns Reporting the Highest Adjusted Gross Incomes Each Year,
1992–2008, at 10 (2011).
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7

$110 billion. So, one way of looking at the pledge is that these
billionaires are not just being generous with their money, but with the
money of the American people.
Americans, even those who are not billionaires, are generous. We
donate more money (and often highly appreciated property) to fund
charitable activities, both in the U.S. and abroad, than taxpayers in any
8
other country. Charities fulfill many important functions in our society,
and in many cases relieve the government of the responsibility of
addressing important social, economic, and cultural functions. Tax
benefits, particularly the charitable tax deduction for individuals and
corporations, play an important role in the success and viability of the
nonprofit sector. No doubt, donors are more generous than they would
be in a world without tax subsidies, perhaps even by an amount greater
9
than the lost tax revenue.
It is curious, though, that despite the long lineage of the charitable
deduction, we lack a comprehensive, coherent theory that explains
successfully why governments should allow tax deductions to subsidize
the current collection of qualified charitable activities and charitable
10
11
organizations. It is not from lack of trying. Early tax theories were
donor-focused, positing that income transferred for charitable purposes
was not personal consumption and, as it was no longer in the control of
12
the donor, should be excluded from tax. Other theories claim that the
charitable tax deduction helps correct market or political failures in our
13
society. Thus, tax benefits help increase the amount of collective goods
or services that are otherwise underprovided because of free-rider and
14
other challenges. The charitable tax deduction also helps decentralize
the spending process by allowing the minority to overcome the
preferences of the majority or the vagaries of the political process in
spending tax dollars, merely by contributing some of their own money to
15
projects that they deem worthy of broader support. But even if one

7. The $110 billion is a very rough estimate arrived at by looking at an estimate of the total
wealth of individuals signing the pledge (roughly $330 billion), an assumed level of donations of twothirds of wealth, and an assumed income, gift, and estate tax benefit of 50%.
8. See Charities Aid Foundation, International Comparisons of Charitable Giving 2 (2006).
9. Gerald E. Auten et al., The Effect of Tax Reform on Charitable Contributions, 45 Nat’l Tax
J. 267, 288 (1992); David Joulfaian, Estate Taxes and Charitable Bequests by the Wealthy, 53 Nat’l Tax
J. 746, 761–62 (2000).
10. David E. Pozen, Remapping the Charitable Deduction, 39 Conn. L. Rev. 531, 547 (2006).
11. See infra Part II.B.
12. See infra notes 95–99 and accompanying text.
13. See infra Part II.B.2.
14. Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Charitable Contributions Deduction, 74 Va. L. Rev. 1393 (1988).
15. Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a Three-Sector
Economy, in The Economics of Nonprofit Institutions: Studies in Structure and Policy 21, 23
(Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986); see also Saul Levmore, Taxes as Ballots, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 387, 402
(1998).
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were convinced that the charitable deduction was intended to address the
problems identified by these theories, it is not clear that the charitable
deduction in its current form is the best way of addressing these failures.
There are real gains from using the tax system to subsidize
charitable activities. Supporters note both the diversity and the higher
quality of charitable goods and services that come from programs funded
by individuals who devote money, and often time and expertise, in
selecting, managing, and monitoring activities that often benefit society
at large, rather than those programs selected by some Washington
16
bureaucrat and managed and monitored by government employees.
But these also are costs. The cost in terms of forgone revenue from
federal tax benefits to individuals and corporations for contributing to
charitable activities is substantial: an estimated $37 billion for 2010 and
17
an estimated $246 billion for fiscal years 2010–2014. The tax cost of
exempting qualifying activities of tax-exempt organizations from income
tax is not included in the list of tax expenditures, but may be about $10
18
billion a year. There are also costs associated with charities behaving
19
badly. The IRS approves virtually all applications for tax-exempt
20
status, and state attorneys general lack the resources or interest to
monitor the activities of charitable operations within their jurisdictions.
Thus there is little monitoring to ensure charities are actually being
charitable. There also may be substantial opportunity costs, as federal
funds used to support charitable activities chosen by donors perhaps
could have been better spent on other government programs or on
charitable activities selected by a different process. Finally, there are
costs related to allowing a minority to dictate how federal funds are
spent. For just about any activity or cause for which a charitable
organization exists, there are supporters and detractors—whether it is
funding for opera, different religions and religious activity, or questions
involving controversial subjects like funding for Planned Parenthood, the
21
Westboro Baptist Church, or USC football.

16. Harold M. Hochman & James D. Rodgers, The Optimal Tax Treatment of Charitable
Contributions, in Economics of Nonprofit Institutions, supra note 15, at 224, 238 (noting that
wealthy donors are more likely to donate expertise in addition to money, as opposed to less well-off
charitable individuals).
17. Staff of J. Comm. on Tax’n, 111th Cong., Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for
Fiscal Years 2010–2014, at 43–48 (Comm. Print 2010).
18. Evelyn Brody & Joseph J. Cordes, Tax Treatment of Nonprofit Organizations: A Two-Edged
Sword?, in Nonprofit & Government: Collaboration & Conflict 141, 148–49 (Elizabeth T. Boris &
C. Eugene Steurle eds., 2d ed. 2006); see also Harvey P. Dale, Foreign Charities, 48 Tax Law. 655, 658–
59 (1995).
19. Roger Colinvaux, Charity in the 21st Century: Trending Towards Decay, 11 Fla. Tax Rev. 1,
19 (2011).
20. IRS, Pub. 55B, Data Book, 2008, at 55 (2009).
21. Internal Revenue Code section 170(l) allows donors to deduct 80% of contributions made to
universities (often limited by the university to contributions made to athletic programs) to secure elite
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Should we allow tax benefits to subsidize charitable activities? One
approach is simply to ask whether we are better off with the current tax
regime than we would be without it: the “take or leave it” approach.
Donors do a lot of good things that local or federal governments would
or could not do, and it may be worth the potential financial and other
costs to obtain these good works. While we lack a single theory that
marries tax subsidies to the current collection of qualified charitable
activities and charitable organizations, the existing tax regime offers a
well-accepted set of trade-offs that results in diversity, pluralism, and
22
even cacophony that are important in our society. In a world of
imperfect information and political economy challenges, providing
matching federal funds through the charitable deduction may be the best
approach to increase the level of underprovided goods and services in a
liberal, democratic society, such as ours.
Alternatively, one can imagine a “bang for the buck” approach,
designing government assistance for charitable activities in a way that
maximizes the return for amount of government funds expended. This
could include measures such as narrowing the definition of qualified
charitable activities to claim deductions for contributions, matching
deductions for specific activities rather than entities, converting the
charitable deduction into a credit, or adopting targeted grants or credits
to support specific charitable activities.
A few years ago, this was just an academic (in the pejorative sense
of the word) question. But in just five years, the charitable tax deduction
23
has gone from politically untouchable to potential collateral (or not so
collateral) damage in the name of fundamental tax reform. In his 2010
budget, President Barack Obama proposed limiting the tax benefits for
high-income taxpayers for personal deductions, including the charitable
24
deduction, as a revenue-raising proposal. Two recent reform proposals
go further and seek to repeal many personal deductions, replacing the
charitable tax deduction with a credit, as a means to dramatically
25
increase the tax base so that tax rates can be reduced. Additionally, the
status that allows them preferential tickets to athletic events. I.R.C. § 170(l) (2010).
22. Harvey P. Dale, Commentary on Eric M. Zolt, Tax Deductions for Charitable Contributions:
Domestic Activities, Foreign Activities, or None of the Above, Presentation at the NYU School of
Law Colloquium on Tax Policy and Public Finance (Mar. 10, 2011) (on file with the Author).
23. President George W. Bush charged his 2005 tax reform advisory panel to recognize “the
importance of homeownership and charity in American society,” a not-so-subtle recommendation to
preserve tax benefits for mortgage interest and charitable deductions. President’s Advisory Panel on
Federal Tax Reform, Simple, Fair, and Pro-Growth: Proposals to Fix America’s Tax System 41
(2005).
24. The Obama budget proposal would allow donors to deduct an amount equal to 28% of their
contributions, even if their marginal tax rate exceeded 28%. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office
of the President, A New Era of Responsibility: Renewing America’s Promise 29 (2009).
25. See Debt Reduction Task Force, Restoring America’s Future: Reviving the Economy,
Cutting Spending and Debt, and Creating a Simple, Pro-Growth Tax System 33 (2010) (proposing
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Congressional Budget Office has recently evaluated eleven proposals for
26
changing the tax incentives of charitable giving.
This Article seeks to contribute to the debate on the desirability of
the charitable tax deduction by focusing on a smaller part of the
charitable tax world—charitable deductions for foreign assistance.
Charitable tax benefits for foreign assistance raise many of the same key
issues that arise in the purely domestic context, such as the relative
worthiness of competing charitable projects, the mandatory participation
by the indirect taxpayer-donors in projects favored by those who are
willing to contribute their own funds, questions of monitoring and
enforcement, and the use of for-profit entities to achieve charitable
purposes.
Tax benefits for foreign assistance also raise several issues that may
be less important or absent in subsidizing domestic activities. For
example, if part of the rationale for tax benefits for charitable activity
rests on the underprovision of certain collective goods or services in a
society, using funds from Country A to support activities in Country B
may be problematic. In addition, using tax subsidies for foreign
assistance may support activities that are at odds with U.S. government
policies in a particular country or region. Finally, the existing theories of
charitable contributions assume a simple three-sector model with
government, a private sector, and a nonprofit sector that are part of a
27
single society in which voting, contributions, and subsidies takes place.
Cross-border charitable assistance involves more actors (multilateral
institutions, bilateral donors, foreign governments, and foreign charities)
and more preferences (recipient country and its citizens) than domestic
charitable activity.
The following examples may be useful in thinking about the issues
raised in this Article:
• Should we allow tax benefits to subsidize contributions made to
domestic charities to support assistance to victims of Hurricane
Katrina? (domestic charities with domestic activities)
• Should we allow tax benefits to subsidize contributions made to
domestic charities to support assistance to victims of the Japanese
earthquake and tsunami? (domestic charities with foreign
activities)
to replace the existing charitable deduction with a 15% refundable credit that would be paid to the
qualifying charity rather than to the donor-taxpayer); Nat’l Comm. on Fisc. Resp. & Ref., Co-Chairs’
Proposal 22–27 (2010) (proposing to replace the existing charitable deduction with a 12% credit for
charitable contributions in excess of 2% of the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income; for those billionaires
with low marginal tax rates and relatively low adjusted gross income, the credit may yield greater tax
saving than the existing charitable-deduction regime).
26. Cong. Budget Off., Pub. No. 4030, Options for Changing the Tax Treatment of
Charitable Giving 9–19 (May 2011).
27. See, e.g., Weisbrod, supra note 15.
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• Should we allow tax benefits to subsidize contributions made to
Japanese charities to support assistance to victims of the Japanese
earthquake and tsunami? (foreign charities with foreign activities)
• Should we allow tax benefits to subsidize contributions made to
for-profit entities engaged in charitable activities? (for-profit
charities, regardless of the domesticity of their organization or
activities)
These are important questions. But current charitable, economic,
and legal scholarship provide relatively little guidance in determining
whether to allow charitable deductions to support charitable activities
outside the U.S., to support foreign charities, and to support for-profit
entities that engage in charitable activities. And perhaps the failure of
the current scholarship to lead us to answers on foreign charitable
activities should lead us to question the regime it supports domestically.
Congress adopted much of the current tax regime covering
qualifications for tax-exempt status and the deductibility of charitable
contributions when most U.S. taxpayers were focusing little attention on
foreign charitable activities. It is time to examine the current tax regime
that applies to foreign charitable assistance and whether, or how, it
should be changed, by focusing on three key questions: (1) Should tax
benefits support charitable activities outside the U.S.? (2) Should the tax
system treat foreign charities differently from domestic charities?
(3) Should the tax system extend charitable tax benefits to for-profit
entities engaged in charitable activities, including activities outside the
U.S.?
The extension of the charitable deduction to foreign activities or
for-profit charities, then, becomes an incremental decision: We have a
deduction for domestic charitable activities, so why not for foreign
charitable activities or for-profit entities engaged in charitable activities?
But to answer that question, we must know whether foreign charitable
activities and for-profit charities are sufficiently similar to domestic
charitable activities in the characteristics that warrant the charitable
deduction. So, we must know why we have a domestic charitable
deduction.
Here is the rub. The existing scholarship does not offer a coherent
theory for the domestic charitable deduction, and certainly not one
robust enough to cover the current collection of qualified charitable
activities and charitable organizations, either normatively or descriptively.
Perhaps attempting to solve the question of whether to extend the
domestic charitable deduction to foreign activities (or for-profit
charities) provides us with the chance to evaluate the strengths and
weaknesses of our current policy approach and to consider alternatives.
Starting with a clean slate, strong arguments can be made that the best
way for the U.S. government to help achieve social goals in foreign
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countries is not by offering to match amounts contributed to causes
selected by donors. Similarly, it may be that the best way to engage forprofit entities in charitable activities is not by granting them tax-exempt
status or allowing supporters of these entities to deduct amounts
contributed to fund these activities. This exercise—the design of the
mechanisms to achieve social goals outside the U.S. and to engage forprofit entities both in the U.S. and abroad—may provide useful insights
about whether we should keep our current tax regime for domestic
charitable deductions or consider other alternatives.
Recent scholarship has argued for continuing to allow tax benefits
28
to overseas charitable activities, and for extending charitable tax
29
30
benefits to foreign charities and for-profit charities. These arguments
rest partly on the idea that favorable tax treatment should follow because
there is no meaningful way to distinguish these activities or entities from
31
domestic charities engaged in domestic charitable activities. While these
scholars may be right in arguing for consistent tax treatment for
contributions made to support domestic and foreign charitable activities,
they may be wrong in supporting the charitable deduction as that choice
of tax treatment. Perhaps the best approach is to consider changes to the
current charitable-deduction regime for all charitable activities and to
consider other alternatives for government support and incentives for
charitable activities.
In Part I, this Article undertakes a brief review of the charitable tax
landscape and the consequences of using the tax system as a vehicle for
supporting many types of charitable activities. Part II examines whether
tax benefits should support charitable activities outside the U.S. Part III
reviews whether the tax law should treat foreign charities differently
from domestic charities. Part IV examines whether tax benefits should be
extended to for-profit entities that engage in charitable activities. The
Conclusion looks at the implications for the domestic charitable
deduction raised by these problems.

I. The Charitable Tax Landscape
At a general level, there are two major types of tax benefits
accorded entities engaged in charitable activity. First, the tax law
provides an exemption from income tax for organizations that are
organized and operated for certain qualifying purposes and that are
subject to a “nondistribution constraint,” whereby earnings cannot

28. Pozen, supra note 10, at 600–01.
29. See, e.g., Dale, supra note 18, at 696.
30. Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93 Va. L. Rev. 2017, 2042–
45 (2007).
31. See, e.g., id. at 2029–56; Pozen, supra note 10, at 588-94.
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32

benefit any private shareholder or individual. Second, the tax law allows
individuals and corporations to claim tax deductions for charitable
33
contributions made to qualified organizations. Individuals can deduct
34
the value of the contributions against income, gift, and estate taxes.
Additional tax benefits apply to gifts of appreciated property, as
taxpayers can generally avoid the capital gains tax on donated property
while deducting the fair market value from a portion of their taxable
35
income.
In thinking about tax deductions for charitable activities both within
and outside the U.S., it may be useful to start with this exercise: Imagine
there are $50 billion in government funds available each year to support
charitable activities. How should those funds be allocated? Ideally, from
a utilitarian standpoint, the funds would be used to encourage those
36
activities with the greatest social returns. The gains from the charitable
activities would reflect both the worthiness of purpose and the efficiency
37
of performance. This “comparable worthiness” approach would rank
competing projects and fund those activities and organizations that have
38
the greatest potential gains.
The framework below sets forth different combinations of funding
and allocation decisions that reflect the public and private nature of
39
using tax deductions to subsidize charitable activities.

32. Several different types of organizations qualify for tax-exempt status under section 501 of the
Internal Revenue Code. Section 501(c)(3) provides for eight categories of organizations that qualify
for tax-exempt status. See generally Richard Schmalbeck, Reforming Uneven Subsidies in the
Charitable Sector, 66 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 237 (2010). Most entities qualify for tax exemption by
being organized and operated for religious, charitable, or educational purposes. Other qualifying
activities include entities organized for scientific, public-safety testing, or literary purposes, and
organizations intended to foster national, or international amateur sports competition, or for the
prevention of cruelty to children or animals. There are also prohibitions on political campaign activity
and excessive lobbying. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010).
33. I.R.C. § 170(c)(1) (2010).
34. See Bruce R. Hopkins, The Law of Tax-Exempt Organizations 32–35 (10th ed. 2011); see
also I.R.C. §§ 170(a), 2055(a)(2), 2522(a) (2010).
35. Daniel Halperin, A Charitable Contribution of Appreciated Property and the Realization of
Built-In Gains, 56 Tax L. Rev. 1, 10 (2002). In addition to these two types of tax benefits, tax-exempt
entities may also have access to tax-exempt financing, which can substantially reduce the cost of
borrowing. Tax-exempt entities also may qualify for state and local income tax, sales tax, and property
tax benefits. See generally Brody & Cordes, supra note 18.
36. Schmalbeck, supra note 32, at 237.
37. Id. at 245–47.
38. It would be very difficult to implement this approach as it would require some consensus for
determining the relative worthiness of different charitable activities and for determining and
measuring the effectiveness of performance. Id. at 250–51.
39. This framework was suggested by Mitchell Kane in his Commentary on Eric M. Zolt, Tax
Aspects of Private Development Assistance, Presentation at NYU School of Law Rubin International
Law Symposium (Dec. 4, 2009), available at http://iilj.org/research/documents/Zolt.ppt.
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Table 1: Combinations of Funding and Allocation Decisions
Funding Alternatives
Private Funds
Public Funds

Allocation
Alternatives

Private
Actors

Unmatched portion of
charitable contributions

Matching portion of
charitable contributions

Public
Actors

Government regulation
(incentives and
restrictions on the use of
private funds)

Direct government
programs (such as official
development assistance to
foreign countries)

The upper left box reflects the use by individuals or corporations of
their own funds to support activities they choose. This is the after-tax
cost of charitable contributions (so if an individual is in the 35% marginal
tax bracket and makes a $1,000 contribution, the value of the tax
deduction is $350 and the after-tax cost would be $650). For those
individuals who receive no tax benefits for their contributions, either
because they do not itemize deductions or have no tax liability, the full
amount of their contribution would be included in this box.
The upper right box reflects the tax benefits associated with the
contribution. Here private actors determine how public funds are
allocated. Who needs Senators Barbara Boxer or Dianne Feinstein? I
can get my own private earmark to support medical services to combat
cholera in Haiti simply by writing a check to the U.S. affiliate of Doctors
Without Borders (Médécins Sans Frontières).
The bottom left box reflects government regulation that influences
the use of private funds for charitable purposes. This includes both
incentives for funding certain types of activities and organizations and
disincentives and prohibitions against certain types of activities, such as
expenditures that may jeopardize an organization’s tax-exempt status or
40
that may result in excise taxes for private foundations.
Finally, the bottom right box reflects public actors spending public
funds. This could be Congress deciding directly how funds from general
tax revenues should be spent or delegating spending decisions to specific
government agencies, such as the Department of State, or to some band
of experts, such as the governing boards of the National Science
Foundation or the National Endowment of the Arts. The key insight is
that the decision to provide federal funds for charitable activities can be
separated from the decision of who gets to decide how federal funds are
spent.

40. See I.R.C. § 4945 (2010); Private Foundations—Taxable Expenditures (Sec. 4945), Tax Mgmt.
Portfolio (BNA) No. 474 (2008).
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But the charitable deduction is not just about funding worthwhile
projects. The $50 billion of government funds could be used to create
incentives for private actors to contribute not just their money, but their
ideas, their expertise, and their ability to monitor activities. These
behavioral effects lead to targeting incentives to increase the level of
41
marginal giving and participation. Perhaps this justifies using the tax
system to target matching grants to the rich (high-bracket taxpayers)
42
rather than the middle class or the poor.
Viewing the charitable deduction as a matching grant program
sponsored by the federal government highlights some of the undesirable
43
aspects of the current tax regime. Because the matching grant program
is run through the federal income tax system, only some donations get
matched and how much gets matched depends on the contributor’s
44
income tax rate. Most notably, only those who itemize deductions for
tax purposes have their charitable deductions matched by the federal
45
government. This often means that upper-middle-income and highincome taxpayers get tax benefits from charitable contributions, but
middle-income and low-income taxpayers do not. Individuals can dictate
how some of the roughly $50 billion in annual federal matching funds are
spent, but they must contribute their own funds and itemize their
deductions to get a say in the allocation.
The current tax system sets the marginal reimbursement rate for
charitable contributions (the subsidy amounts) equal to the donor’s
marginal tax rate. But there is no theoretical reason why this is a
46
desirable result. The optimal marginal reimbursement rate depends on
several factors, such as responsiveness to tax incentives, “voice” in
allocating federal funds for charitable purposes, and incentives in
recruiting donors to select, fund, and monitor charitable projects. The
choice of optimal marginal tax rates reflects a very different set of
considerations.

41. David M. Schizer, Subsidizing Charitable Contributions: Incentives, Information and the
Private Pursuit of Public Goals, 62 Tax L. Rev. 221, 235–39 (2009).
42. Id.
43. One could keep the amount of federal funding for charitable activities constant but design a
matching grant program that avoids several of the deficiencies of the current charitable tax deduction.
See Paul R. McDaniel, Federal Matching Grants for Charitable Contributions: A Substitute for the
Income Tax Deduction, 27 Tax L. Rev. 377, 413–14 (1971).
44. Charles T. Clotfelter & Lester M. Salamon, The Impact of the 1981 Tax Act on Individual
Charitable Giving, in Economics of Nonprofit Institutions, supra note 15, at 207, 209.
45. Generally, only about 30% of taxpayers itemize their deductions. See generally Deena
Ackerman & Gerald Auten, Floors, Ceilings, and Opening the Door for a Non-Itemizer Deduction,
59 Nat’l Tax J. 509 (2006). In 2008, 33.8% of individual U.S. tax returns claimed itemized deductions.
IRS, Pub. 4198, 2010 Tax Statistics: Statistics of Income (2010).
46. Daniel Shaviro, Commentary on Eric M. Zolt, Tax Deductions for Charitable Contributions,
Presentation at the NYU School of Law Colloquium on Tax Policy and Public Finance (Mar. 10, 2011)
(on file with the Author).
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For those who value large scale charitable projects by wealthy
individuals, the current system likely provides inadequate tax incentives
for charitable contributions. Many of the billionaires who signed the
Giving Pledge likely have relatively low marginal income tax rates (but
47
gift and estate tax rates of 35%). Most of their wealth is in the form of
unrealized capital appreciation and most of their income is tax favored,
either in the form of tax-exempt interest or dividends, capital gains, and
“carried interest” in investment partnerships, each of which is subject to
48
a 15% tax rate. If we really wanted to encourage the very wealthy to be
more charitable (particularly the young billionaires), it makes sense to
increase the charitable subsidy by increasing the marginal reimbursement
rate, and not tie the subsidy to their tax rate. In contrast, for those who
are concerned that high-income taxpayers already have greater voice in
allocating federal funds for their favored charities (charities engaged in
educational, cultural, and medical activities) rather than charities favored
by lower-income individuals (religious institutions and social welfare
agencies), the marginal reimbursement rate would be the same for all
49
donors, regardless of tax rate.
One could keep the total amount of federal funding for charitable
activities at the same $50 billion amount, but design a matching grant
program that has different allocation and matching criteria from the
current system. For example, if Congress determines that $200 million of
federal funds should be allocated to match private contributions made to
museums, then museums could apply for matching funds based on
50
criteria besides idiosyncratic donor preferences.
A common refrain among tax scholars is that the tax deduction for
51
charitable contributions has an “upside-down” effect. High-bracket
taxpayers receive greater tax benefits than low-bracket taxpayers; and
those taxpayers who do not itemize their deductions receive no tax
52
benefit at all. Of the estimated $35 billion in tax benefits related to
charitable deductions in 2009, over $19.1 billion went to taxpayers with
$200,000 or more in income and $9.1 billon went to taxpayers with
53
incomes of $100,000 to $200,000. Concern with this upside-down effect
47. See IRS, supra note 6, at 11.
48. Id. at 3.
49. See Appendix B, infra, for information on charitable giving by households, income levels, and
type of charity.
50. This approach has the advantage of being more transparent as to the level of funding for the
activity and the identity of the beneficiaries of federal funds. Depending on the requirements to be
eligible for matching funds, it may also reduce funds spent on nonqualifying activities. At the same
time, this approach also has several disadvantages, including higher administrative costs and the
potential risk of corruption and similar challenges that come with having government officials involved
in allocating funds.
51. See, e.g., McDaniel, supra note 43, at 383–84.
52. Justin Bryan, Individual Income Tax Returns, Stat. Income Bull., Fall 2009, at 7–14.
53. Staff of J. Comm. on Tax’n, supra note 16, at 56. A more detailed analysis is presented in

Zolt_63-HLJ-361 (Do Not Delete)

374

12/18/2011 8:31 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:361

has led to proposals to replace the charitable deduction with a
54
refundable credit.
While the charitable deduction certainly provides greater financial
incentives for those in higher tax brackets, my own take is slightly
different and highlights the tax burden of high-bracket non-donors. At a
general level, the tax cost of charitable deductions can be viewed as
either reducing government spending or increasing taxes; so either
government programs are smaller for tax year 2010 by the $37 billion
that subsidized taxpayer contribution to charity, or taxes on other
taxpayers are higher by $37 billion (or some combination). As a group,
the top 10% of taxpayers pay about 70% of total federal income taxes,
and the top 50% of taxpayers pay all or mostly all of federal income
55
taxes. So who bears the costs of subsidizing charity? If one takes the
view that tax rates are higher because of the charitable deduction, then
the cost of this subsidy is borne by less charitable high-income taxpayers.
Thus, the poor are not disproportionately subsidizing the Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation’s activities or the Los Angeles Opera’s $32
million post-modern production of Richard Wagner’s Ring Cycle; it is
the high-bracket taxpayers who are not charitably inclined who bear the
56
major burden of these endeavors.
With the benefits of leveraging government funds to increase the
money and expertise contributed by private actors to charitable activities
comes the responsibility of ensuring that the private and matching
government funds are actually used for charitable purposes. For practical
purposes, the bar for qualifying for charitable status for both tax and
state law purposes is remarkably low. The IRS and state governments
share oversight of the nonprofit sector. The IRS has the authority to
grant the initial qualification for tax-exempt status, while nonprofit status
Appendix B, infra, using data from Center on Philanthropy at Ind. U., Patterns of Household
Charitable Giving by Income Group, 2005, at 12 (2007).
54. See William Vickrey, Agenda for Progressive Taxation 131 (1947); Lily L. Batchelder et
al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 23, 52–53
(2006); Brian H. Jenn, The Case for Tax Credits, 61 Tax Law. 549, 555–57 (2007). The choice between
a credit and a deduction for charitable contributions depends on both equity and efficiency
considerations, as well as on one’s view of the purpose of the charitable deduction. If the purpose is to
correct failures in the political process, the credit approach has great appeal as the deduction both
disenfranchises lower-income individuals and gives higher-income individuals disproportionate power
over the direction of federal funds. If the purpose is to correct market failures in underprovided public
goods, a deduction approach may yield more “bang for the buck,” assuming high-income donors are
more responsive to tax incentives than are low-income donors.
55. The Tax Policy Center estimates that 46% of American households will owe no income tax in
2011. Rachel Johnson et al., Tax Pol’y Center, Why Some Tax Units Pay No Income Tax 1 (July
2011).
56. This may be another factor in why the current tax regime for charitable contributions is part
of a political bargain that is acceptable to low-income and middle-income groups. See Jeff Strand, The
Charitable Deduction: A Politico-Economic Analysis, in Economics of Nonprofit Institutions, supra
note 15, at 265–68.
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57

is determined under state corporate law. The IRS receives more than
50,000 applications for tax-exempt status each year and approves
58
virtually all of them. As long as the organization complies with the rules
against private inurement, private benefit, and political activity, the IRS
will generally grant tax-exempt status to any organization that has a
59
plausible charitable purpose, broadly defined.
There are mandatory disclosure requirements for charities with
60
annual gross receipts over $25,000. The IRS has revised the tax return
form applicable to tax-exempt organizations (Form 990) to include more
questions related to governance and has published best-practice
61
governance guidelines. While the IRS has the authority to terminate
62
tax-exempt status for violating the prohibitions against private benefits
63
or certain public policy provisions, the IRS has few sanctions for less
64
serious violations.
In response to some abuses concerning charities controlled by a
small group of donors, Congress has imposed additional limitations for
those charities where donors and control are highly concentrated, known
as private foundations. The tax law provides for several excise taxes that
apply to self-dealing and other transactions between insiders and the
65
private foundation. Private foundations are also required to make
“qualifying distributions” to charitable activities each year equal to 5%
66
of their net assets. Private foundations cannot treat grants to foreign
57. Jill R. Horwitz, Does Nonprofit Ownership Matter?, 24 Yale J. on Reg. 139, 146–47 (2007).
58. In 2008, the IRS approved about 98% of all applications. Rob Reich, Lacey Dorn & Stefanie
Sutton, Stan. U. Ctr. on Philanthropy & Civ. Soc’y, Anything Goes: Approval of Nonprofit
Status by the I.R.S. 7–11 (2009).
59. Reich, Dorn, and Sutton have demonstrated how little the IRS exercises any substantive
oversight by listing the twenty most eccentric public charities approved by the IRS in 2008. Id. at 17–
24. These organizations include the All Colorado Beer Festival, Curtains Without Borders, the
International Society of Talking Clock Collectors, and the Gateway Sisters of Perpetual Indulgences
(nuns from the leather community). Id.
60. Organizations with annual gross receipts of less than $25,000 ($50,000 for tax years ending on
or after December 31, 2010) are required to file Form-990-N, also known as the e-postcard. This form
requires only very basic information about the charitable organization.
61. See generally Tax Analysts, IRS Releases Final 2008 Form 990 for Tax-Exempt Organizations,
2007 Tax Notes Today 246-16.
62. I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 7805(b)(8) (2010); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(c)(3)-(c)(2), 301.7805-1(b) (2010).
63. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 579 (1983) (upholding the IRS’s
revocation of tax-exempt status for violating the established public policy of discouraging
discrimination in education).
64. Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Brendan M. Wilson, Regulating Philanthropy in the 21st Century: An
Institutional Choice Analysis, 85 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 479, 526 (2009).
65. The IRS regulates private foundations through a series of excise tax provisions set forth in
sections 4940–4946. These include taxes on failure to satisfy minimum distribution obligations,
sanctions on excess business holdings, sanctions on jeopardizing investments, and sanctions on
“taxable expenditures” (grants where private foundations fail to exercise expenditure responsibility or
fail to make a good faith determination that the recipient organization is equivalent to a section
509(a)(1), (2), or (3) organization).
66. I.R.C. § 4942(g) (2010).
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charities as part of the qualifying distributions unless they can establish
that the foreign grantee has either obtained an exemption ruling from
the IRS or the private foundation has made a good faith determination
67
that the foreign grantee is equivalent to a U.S. public charity. Private
foundations are also subject to excise taxes for certain “taxable
expenditures,” which include amounts contributed to foreign grantees
unless either the private foundation can establish that the recipient is
equivalent to a public charity or that it exercises expenditure
68
responsibility.
Finally, nonprofits are also subject to state government regulation.
Qualifying under state nonprofit law is generally even easier than gaining
69
federal tax-exempt status. In most states, founders simply file a
certificate of incorporation and a copy of the bylaws with the state
70
agency and pay a de minimis fee. Although the state attorney general
has oversight of the activities of charitable organizations organized and
operated in the state, the general consensus is that there has been
inadequate state supervision of charitable activities, particularly with
regard to enforcing the fiduciary duties of officers, directors, and
71
trustees. Dissatisfaction with governance of nonprofits has led to
72
various proposals for greater federal or state oversight. These proposals
include a new federal oversight agency or new state-level agencies or
73
commissions. In addition, there are proposals for additional monitoring
by the private sector through either a private regulatory body with
oversight of certain charities or increased opportunities for individuals to
bring suits challenging improper activities of officers and directors of
74
nonprofit organizations.

67. See Kimberly S. Blanchard, U.S. Taxation of Foreign Charities, 8 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 719,
723 (1993).
68. I.R.C. § 4945(d) (2010). Expenditure responsibility requires (1) a pre-grant inquiry that the
grantee will make reasonable use of funds; (2) a written agreement between the grantor and grantee;
(3) that the grantee will keep funds in a separate account; (4) that the grantee will report in writing
one year after the grant how the funds were used; and (5) that the grantor will report to the IRS how
the funds were used. John A. Edie, Expenditure Responsibility: Step By Step 9 (2002).
69. Horwitz, supra note 57, at 147.
70. Id.
71. Kenneth L. Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibility,
73 Harv. L. Rev. 433, 434–37 (1960).
72. See Mayer & Wilson, supra note 64, at 501–04.
73. Id. at 495–501. Commentators have also called for stronger internal controls for nonprofits.
See Christine Petrovits et al., The Causes and Consequences of Internal Control Problems in Nonprofit
Organizations, 86 Acct. Rev. 325, 329 (2011).
74. See Mayer & Wilson, supra note 64, at 501–04; see also Karst, supra note 71, at 445–49.
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II. Should Tax Benefits Support Charitable Activities
Outside the United States?
With some exceptions and restrictions, current law allows
individuals and corporations to deduct contributions made to U.S.
charities, even if most or all of the funds are used to support foreign
75
charitable activities. Should tax law privilege domestic charitable
activities over foreign charitable activities?
A. General Considerations
To some readers, this may appear to be a relatively easy question:
we should allow tax subsidies for charitable activities outside the U.S.
76
We are rich; they are poor. For a wealthy country, there is a moral
obligation to provide financial and other support for famine and poverty
77
relief. And even from a purely selfish perspective, the negative
externalities attributable to environmental pollutants, infectious diseases,
and destructive ideologies would support subsidizing charitable activities
78
outside the U.S. to minimize domestic consequences.
Over the last twenty years, there has been a substantial shift from
official development assistance by governments and international
79
institutions to private philanthropy and remittances. Foreign charitable
assistance has increased dramatically both from U.S. entities with foreign
charitable activities and from the growth of the charitable sector in both
80
developed and developing countries. Domestic private foundations and
public charities can generally use funds received from U.S. donors to
support foreign charitable activities, but individuals generally cannot
receive tax deductions for contributions made directly to foreign
81
charities. Although tax benefits for foreign charitable activities
supported by U.S. taxpayers are still limited, in 2007 U.S. entities
provided about $40 billion for foreign charitable activities, while U.S.
governmental assistance (aside from tax benefits) totaled only $21.8
82
billion. If the relatively thin popular support for the U.S. government’s
75. See Pozen, supra note 10, at 540–42; see also Dale, supra note 18, at 659–62.
76. About half of the world’s population (about 3 billion people) lives on less than $2.50 a day.
The mortality rate for children under five is fifteen times higher in low-income countries than in highincome countries. Unicef, Levels & Trends in Child Mortality 18 (2011).
77. Moral philosophers, such as Peter Singer, make a compelling case for the “cosmopolitan”
responsibilities of those in affluent countries to help those in countries with extreme poverty. See
generally Peter Singer, The Life You Can Save: Acting Now to End World Poverty (2009).
78. Pozen, supra note 10, at 580.
79. See Heidi Metcalf Little, The Role of Private Assistance in International Development,
42 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 1091, 1091–93 (2010).
80. Hudson Inst. Center for Global Prosperity, The Index of Global Philanthropy and
Remittances 15 (2009); Little, supra note 79, at 1091–93.
81. I.R.C. § 170(c)(1) (2010).
82. Support came from private foundations ($5.4 billion), private and voluntary organizations
($14.3 billion), religious organizations ($8.6 billion), corporations ($6.8 billion), and colleges and
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provision of foreign aid is a good indication of preferences for the
geographic focus of government expenditures, then perhaps the public
favors preferential tax treatment for domestic charitable activities over
83
foreign activities. The tax law in other countries varies greatly, as some
countries require all donated funds to be used within the home country
and other countries impose no geographic limitations on the use of
84
funds.
U.S. charitable organizations have a long tradition of overseas
assistance, mostly rooted in missionary efforts in Africa, Asia, and South
85
America. Putting aside for a moment the difficult line-drawing
questions of religious and humanitarian activity, using government funds
to support these efforts raises many difficult questions. Current foreign
assistance efforts are also problematic. The Gates Foundation spent
$2.5 billion in 2009 to support its charitable efforts outside the U.S.,
86
including its efforts to combat malaria in Africa. In addition to the
roughly $2–3 billion in annual economic and military aid that Israel
receives through direct assistance from the U.S. government, U.S.
individuals make hundreds of millions of dollars in tax-deductible
charitable contributions to U.S. charities that fund activities in Israel,
including a reported $33 million in tax-deductible contributions to fund
87
the building of settlements in disputed territories. Finally, I suspect, but
do not know, that matching government dollars are likely funding both
sides of the conflict regarding the Anti-Homosexuality Bill in Uganda,
with participation by both American evangelical churches and by human
88
and gay rights groups funded by tax-deductible charitable contributions.

universities ($3.9 billion). IRS, Advisory Comm. on Tax Exempt & Gov’t Entities, Pub. 4344, Exempt
Organizations: Recommendations to Improve the Tax Rules Governing International Grant
Making 3 (2009).
83. For example, in 2002, only 45% of the U.S. population was in favor of increasing foreign
financial aid. This was much lower than in other countries such as the United Kingdom (69%), Canada
(64%), Australia (63%), or Germany (68%). The only country in a similar range to the U.S. is Japan,
which also has only 45% of the population’s support for an increase in foreign aid. Pamela Paxton &
Stephen Knack, Individual and Country-Level Factors Affecting Support for Foreign-Aid 27 (World
Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 4714, 2008).
84. Brazil, Russia, and Thailand condition tax deductibility on use of funds within the country,
while Italy, Poland, and South Africa allow charitable tax deductions without regard for where the
funds are used. See Pozen, supra note 10, at 546 n.67. See generally Lester M. Salamon, The
International Guide to Nonprofit Law (1997).
85. Appendix C, infra, provides a relatively current distribution of U.S. nonprofit international
assistance efforts by region.
86. Bill & Melinda Gates Found., 2009 Annual Report 12 (2009).
87. Hillel Schmid & Avishag Rudich, Social Entrepreneurship and the Israeli Reality,
International Conference, The Implications of the Decline in Philanthropy on Israeli
Nonprofit Organizations and Social Services 5 (2008); David Ignatius, A Tax Break Fuels Middle
East Friction, Wash. Post, Mar. 26, 2009, at A21.
88.. See Warren Throckmorton, A U.S. Church and Its “Kill the Gays” Partner in Uganda, Salon.com
(July 2, 2010, 4:01 AM), http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2010/07/02/church_uganda_gays_bill.
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Should the Gates Foundation decide which diseases and which
African countries merit matching funds? Should a relatively small group
of donors influence the flow of matching dollars to Israel rather than
much poorer, and, by some measures, needier developing countries?
And should government funds support either side of the Ugandan antihomosexuality debate?
In his blog, Judge Richard Posner raised the question of whether
Americans should get tax deductions for gifts to domestic charities that
89
donate or operate abroad. Judge Posner argues against allowing such
90
deductions. His opposition does not rest on the grounds that U.S.
government foreign aid projects are more efficient than private activities.
Nor does he challenge a traditional rationale for all charitable
deductions: that the external benefits associated with charitable giving
and the tendency of rational individuals to free ride on the charitable
efforts of others results in the underprovision of certain goods and
services.
Judge Posner puts forth three major grounds for denying charitable
deductions for foreign activities: (1) He believes that denying deductions
for foreign charitable activities will increase funds available for domestic
91
charitable activities (the “substitution effect”), (2) he believes that
denying deductions for foreign charitable activities will reduce the
overall level of charitable contributions so that the tax subsidy for
charitable contributions will decrease, and overall tax revenues will
92
increase (the “revenue effect”), and (3) he suspects that giving to poor
people in the U.S. may create greater utility as compared to giving to
poor people in developing countries—as foreign donations reduce the
pressure for desperately needed political, economic, and social reforms
93
(the “Mugabe effect”).
As a blog post, this explanation likely just reflects Judge Posner’s
initial reactions to the question of the relative merits of domestic and
foreign charities. Nonetheless, the post is a good overview of the general
considerations at work, and it is useful to unpack some of the reasoning
behind Judge Posner’s intuition. There are several possible reasons to
favor substitution away from foreign activities and toward domestic
activities. First, one could value the direct assistance to domestic
recipients more than transfers to foreign beneficiaries. There is a strong
89. Richard Posner, Tax Deductions for American Charitable Donations Abroad, Becker-Posner
Blog (Mar. 15, 2009, 5:29 PM), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2009/03/tax-deductions-for-americancharitable-donations-abroad--posner.html. Economist Gary Becker responded in the same post that
opposition to deductions for donations to foreign charities was just a cover for protectionism, in this
case protecting domestic charitable organizations from competition with foreign organizations. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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intuitive appeal to helping those closer to us (both geographically and
culturally) than those outside our borders. Second, if we focus only on
the overall welfare of our society (defined by national borders), then it is
likely that more of the externalities generated by domestic charitable
activities will remain in our country. Finally, if we view part of the
bargain of providing tax benefits for charitable contributions as relieving
government of the obligation of providing the goods and services
directly, then favoring domestic activities over foreign activities may
reduce the demand for domestic government spending. Each of these
reasons would support a regime that privileged charitable assistance to
victims of Hurricane Katrina over charitable assistance to victims of the
Japanese earthquake and tsunami.
All of these arguments are subject to strong counterclaims. It is hard
to make comparisons between deserving individual recipients in the U.S.
and abroad. Questions as to who are the more deserving beneficiaries
raise difficult value judgments that are hard to evaluate without some
normative framework. And it is difficult to take such a narrow view of
society in measuring general welfare, especially given the international
consequences of many local challenges. Finally, foreign charitable
activities may well result in less direct U.S. government assistance to
foreign countries.
Giving preference to domestic, rather than foreign, altruism for
revenue reasons is also not clear-cut. If the goal is to limit the revenue
cost from charitable contributions, there are probably several
alternatives that could reduce the lost revenue, some with relatively little
effect on charitable giving. For example, there have been several
proposals to provide for charitable deductions only for those
94
contributions in excess of 1% or 2% of adjusted gross income. If the
revenue cost from charitable contributions is considered too large, it is
not obvious without some normative framework that the place to start
chopping is support for foreign charitable activities. The U.S. generally
provides the same tax benefits to all types of charitable activities, even
though one could imagine a regime where certain activities that generate
higher levels of societal benefits (through greater externalities) receive
greater tax benefits than activities where most of the benefits are
captured by those making the contributions.
Finally, a blanket prohibition on tax benefits for deductions for all
foreign charitable activities because of Mugabe and Mugabe-lite
circumstances makes little sense. It is a big hammer, and it may hit the
downtrodden people as much or more than the repressive regime.

94. One recent proposal would allow itemizers to deduct the amount of their charitable donations
in excess of 2% of their adjusted gross income. Cong. Budget Off., supra note 26, at 9–11.
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My objective here is not so much to question Judge Posner’s
intuition about the relative merits of domestic versus foreign altruism,
but rather to highlight some of the challenges in trying to frame the
theoretical and policy issues in deciding whether, how, and how much to
use the tax system to subsidize any charitable activity and whether to
favor charitable activities in the U.S., as compared to charitable activities
outside our borders. The decision to provide a tax subsidy for
contributions to domestic charities for charitable activities in the U.S.
does not rest on a simple, comprehensive theory but rather a set of tradeoffs that balance the costs and benefits of using tax dollars to subsidize
domestic charitable activities. It is not clear that the same set of tradeoffs would apply in the foreign context or that policymakers need adopt
the same tax regime for charitable contributions for foreign activities.
B. Tax Scholarship
Tax scholars have taken different approaches in examining the
justifications for tax benefits for charitable activities. With respect to tax
deductibility of charitable contributions, the literature falls into two
general categories. One group of scholars focuses primarily on the donor.
They justify allowing tax deductions for charitable contributions based
on considerations of designing the proper base for taxation and income
measurement. A mostly different group of scholars justifies tax benefits
for charitable deductions as a subsidy for collective goods and services.
The difference is important. The donor-based theories are rooted in the
design of a tax system. In contrast, the subsidy-based theories seek to use
the tax system as a means to achieve non-tax objectives, in this case
increasing incentives for private donors to support and monitor
charitable activities and providing matching funds to supplement their
efforts.
1. Donor-Oriented Approaches
Early examinations of the role of charitable deductions in an ideal
tax system worked within the Haig-Simons framework, which defines
income as the sum of personal consumption (“private preclusive use”)
95
plus wealth accumulation over a given time period. Considering this
definition of income, amounts transferred as charitable contributions are
not income to the donor because they do not result in exclusive personal
consumption. Instead, such contributions create common goods whose
enjoyment is not confined to contributors, nor apportioned among
96
contributors according to amounts of contributions. In contrast to other

95. William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 309, 313,
320–21 (1972).
96. Id. at 346.
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approaches, under the donor-oriented approach there is no effective
government subsidy for charitable contributions, as such amounts are not
considered income in the first place.
Alternatively, but still considering the perspective of the donor, a
charitable deduction should be allowed because it equitably accounts for
97
loss of welfare by the donor. Society should reward those who transfer
private resources for the public good. In addition, as donations often
derive from perceived moral obligations, the involuntary nature of the
transfer should not require the donor to be taxed on such amounts.
Serious challenges have been offered to both of these donor98
oriented approaches. What is striking is how relatively poorly these
theories have held up over time. While they reflect a common intuition
that money (or other property) transferred to charity should qualify for
income tax deductions, the theoretical basis for charitable deductions as
a way of accurately measuring income remains shaky.
These donor-focused theories provide little guidance as to what
types of charitable activities warrant support or whether giving for
domestic activities should be preferred over giving for foreign charitable
activities. As long as the donor gives up control of the property, it does
not matter how or where the donated resources are actually used. These
theories justify the tax deduction because donors are worse off as a result
of their charitable donations. To the extent that geographic distance
between the donor and the beneficiaries makes it harder for a donor to
achieve reputational, social, or financial advantages from donations, an
argument could be made that the donor-centric theories favor giving to
99
foreign charitable activity over domestic activity. However, in the age of
Bono and Angelina Jolie, for many donors it may be more chic to give
globally rather than locally, so physical distance may no longer serve to
separate donors from the direct or indirect (psychological) benefits of the
donations.
2. Subsidy-Oriented Approaches
A second common approach is to justify the charitable deduction
(and other tax benefits) as a subsidy for certain types of underprovided
collective goods and services. There are several strands of the subsidy
literature, focusing on different types of market failure or government
failure. The market failure arguments generally start with examination of

97. Boris I. Bittker, Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants?, 28 Tax L.
Rev. 37, 46–49 (1972).
98. See generally Gergen, supra note 14 (concluding that the loss-of-welfare theory is valid, but
subject to significant constraints); Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit
Poorly in an “Ideal” Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 Stan. L. Rev.
831 (1979) (discounting true altruism).
99. Pozen, supra note 10, at 573.
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public goods—those goods where one person’s consumption does not
reduce availability to others (“nonrival”) and there is no way to exclude
100
others from enjoying the good (“nonexclusive”). Such goods will be
undersupplied because self-interested individuals will choose to free ride
on the charitable activities of others rather than pay to support the goods
101
and services themselves. As a practical matter, most goods provided by
governments are rival and excludable. These goods and services include
102
schools, hospitals, roads, and various transfer payments. But these
goods and services can generate externalities that are not fully captured
103
There is thus a role for charities (and
by market participants.
governments) to supply such goods where there are substantial secondary
benefits.
Some types of goods and services provide elements of public goods
and private assistance. For example, disaster relief for hurricane and
earthquake victims is an example of pure public goods if one focuses on
the benefits that accrue to society generally rather than the specific
private assistance given to the individuals or the specific pleasures donors
104
receive from making the contributions. Donors to charitable relief
efforts get the satisfaction of seeing their dollars help relieve the
suffering caused by natural disasters. But non-donors also get
psychological benefits from seeing a reduction in suffering. They can free
ride off the generosity of others. Allowing a tax deduction for charitable
contributions thus both increases the amount of funds going to these
types of relief efforts (correcting a suboptimal level of funding) and
imposes costs on those uncharitable individuals (making them
involuntary contributors to these causes).
Support for tax subsidies for charitable contributions also rests on
potential failures that may be inherent in the government decisionmaking
process. If we leave all spending decisions to the political process, the
level of collective goods and services would be decided by majority rule.
The tax subsidy for charitable contributions allows, at least for certain
types of goods and services, the preferences of a minority of voters who
have a greater taste for certain collective activities to receive government
105
support, as long as they are willing also to pay for them. This
decentralized approach allows for greater diversity, innovation, and other
106
benefits. Under this view, the greater the heterogeneity of preferences

100. See Gergen, supra note 14, at 1397; see also Robin W. Boadway & David E. Wildasin, Public
Sector Economics 57–60 (2d ed. 1984).
101. Gergen, supra note 14, at 1398.
102. Id.
103. Id. Market failures could also result from other causes, such as information asymmetries.
104. Id. at 1397–98.
105. Levmore, supra note 15, at 405–06.
106. Id. at 408–12.
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for collective goods, the stronger the case for tax subsidies for charitable
contributions.
But who should decide which types of goods are underprovided by
either the government or the market? Under the current regime of
matching charitable contributions, individual donors can direct
government spending while bypassing majority approval. Minority
107
preferences dictate government spending patterns. This tax regime
allows Harvard, NYU, Yale, and UCLA to receive the lion’s share of
matching tax dollars directed for higher education (rather than
108
community colleges or historically black colleges) and results in the
U.S. government providing greater financial subsidies to charities in
109
Israel than to charities in poor developing countries. It may be that
donors got it exactly right in allocating the federal funds to deserving
educational institutions and deserving foreign countries in a way that
110
reflects popular preferences and maximizes social returns, but I doubt
it. The harder question is whether they, as a group, can do a better job
than Congress, the Departments of Education or State, some band of
experts, or a matching grant program that allocated funds based on
different criteria than the current tax regime. For our purposes, it is
remarkable how little guidance these subsidy theories provide on such
basic questions as which types of activities should qualify for favorable
tax treatment and whether to extend tax deductions for foreign
charitable activities. While the subsidy theories may provide general
support for the government matching of private contributions, they do
not tell us what types of activities to support, how much, or in which
countries. Attempts to rank charities as to their relative worthiness based
111
on purpose and effectiveness of performance face substantial obstacles.
This is perhaps unsurprising given both the difficulty of achieving
political consensus on those activities that are more or less worthy and of
assessing the relative efficiency and effectiveness of performance.
Part of the challenge in thinking about tax subsidies for charities is
the sheer number of and diversity within charitable organizations. In
2009 there were approximately 1.6 million nonprofit organizations,
including almost 400,000 religious congregations, which are not required

107. Ilan Benshalom, The Dual Subsidy Theory of Charitable Deductions, 84 Ind. L.J. 1047, 1063
(2009); Ray D. Madoff, What Leona Helmsley Can Teach Us About the Charitable Deduction, 85 Chi.Kent L. Rev. 957, 966 (2010).
108.. In a 2010 survey, the top twenty colleges and universities represented about 2% of the total
number of institutions but received about 25.5% of all 2010 gifts to higher education institutions.
Council for Aid to Educ., Colleges and Universities Raise $28 Billion in 2010, at 2 (2011).
109. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
110. This need not be due to donors having preferences different from the socially optimal
distribution. An inefficient distribution of charitable giving would likely occur simply from
information asymmetries.
111. See generally Schmalbeck, supra note 32.
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to file with the IRS. In terms of spending, health service organizations
account for 59% of total nonprofit spending, with educational
113
organizations accounting for an additional 17%. In terms of tax
subsidies, the Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that for 2010,
charitable deductions for educational institutions will result in tax
expenditures of $5.5 billion, for health organizations will result in tax
expenditures of $4.3 billion, and for charitable organizations other than
education and health, including religious organizations, will result in tax
114
expenditures of $30.2 billion. Charitable organizations also vary greatly
in the proportion of revenues that comes from fees for services rather
115
than donations and grants.
One’s enthusiasm for using tax subsidies for charitable contributions
is likely influenced by both the ability of the IRS and states’ attorneys
general to monitor the activities of the charities and by how effective
federal funds are in increasing the level of underprovided goods and
services. The apparent unwillingness of the IRS to provide meaningful
review of applications for tax-exempt status and the difficulty for both
the IRS and state officials of monitoring effectively the large number of
charities under their supervision undermine our confidence that a
significant amount of donors’ funds and federal matching funds are being
well spent on charitable activities, or at least that they could not be better
spent by other charitable organizations. Even where there is no improper
use of funds, there may be a mismatch between theories supporting tax
subsidies and the types of charities receiving those subsidies.
A strong case can be made for subsidizing charities providing
disaster relief and social welfare services because of market failures in
the level of services that would exist without government intervention.
116
This fits nicely with a “plain-meaning” and historical view of charity.
The case for subsidization of many other types of charities under market
117
failure theories is much weaker. Operas, museums, and private schools
112. Number of Nonprofit Organizations in the United States, 1999–2009, Nat’l Ctr. for
Charitable Stat., http://nccsdataweb.urban.org/PubApps/profile1.php (last visited Dec. 23, 2011).
Classifying a nonprofit as “religious” is difficult due to IRS reporting requirements.
113. James R. Hines, Jr., et al., The Attack on Nonprofit Status: A Charitable Assessment,
108 Mich. L. Rev. 1179, 1185 (2010).
114. Staff of J. Comm. on Tax’n, 111th Cong., Estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures for
Fiscal Years 2010–2014, tbl.1, at 43–48 (Comm. Print 2010) (including corporate and individual
deductions).
115. Dennis R. Young, Nonprofit Revenue Streams: Finding the Right Mix, Mandel Ctr. for
Nonprofit Orgs. 9–10 (May 20, 2004), http://www.nationalcne.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=
feature.display&feature_id=81.
116. Charity is the “voluntary giving of help, typically in the form of money, to those in need.” The
New Oxford American Dictionary 288 (2001).
117. In the domestic context, Mark Gergen is one of the few scholars to examine specific activities
under different justifications for tax subsidies. He finds that contributions to social welfare agencies
are supported on both subsidy and equity grounds. Other types of charitable activities do not fare as
well under the Gergen approach. Contributions to public television fail to satisfy either the subsidy or
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are examples of what may be called “club goods”—goods that can be
118
fenced and made available only to members. The case for subsidies to
these entities is much less compelling. While these organizations produce
some spillover benefits to society at large, most of the benefits are
enjoyed by their members.
Historically, churches were one of the primary providers of
119
assistance to the poor, ill, and helpless. They provide an effective
collective mechanism for matching donors to needy beneficiaries. Today,
however, some scholars contend that only a small percentage of funds
120
(approximately 12%) go to charitable activities for the poor, with the
vast majority (70–80%) going to property improvement or operating
121
expenses, such as salaries that benefit church members primarily.
While churches generate benefits to the community and to society, even
putting aside issues of using government funds to support religious
activity, it is not clear that this justifies full deductibility of contributions
to religious organizations.
These subsidy theories often seem to support extension of the
122
charitable deduction to foreign charitable activities. For example, if the
rationale for tax subsidies for charitable contributions rests on
government or market failures, then those societies with great failures
may benefit the most from receiving charitable assistance. Law and
development scholars generally contend that governments (and other
providers) may have a greater role to play where markets function
123
poorly. Particularly for low-income and middle-income countries, the
size of government is correlated with per capita income, and many
developing countries lack resources to provide for certain basic collective
124
goods and services. But while there is a clear need for assistance in
many low-income and middle-income foreign countries, it is not clear
who should provide the assistance and what the form the assistance
should take.
equity theory, while church-related expenditures do well under an equity theory but poorly under a
subsidy theory. Gergen, supra note 14, at 1433–49.
118. Id.; Brian Galle, The Role of Charity in a Federal System 9 (Fla. State Univ. Coll. of Law, Pub.
Law Research Paper No. 394, Bus. & Econ. Paper No. 09-25 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1473107.
119. See generally Robert A. Gross, Giving in America: From Charity to Philanthropy, in Charity,
Philanthropy, and Civility in American History 29 (Lawrence J. Friedman & Mark D. McGarvie
eds., 2003) (discussing Christian charity’s early charitable purposes in America).
120. Susan K. E. Saxon-Harrold et al., America’s Religious Congregations: Measuring Their
Contribution to Society 5 (2000) (using 1996 survey data).
121. Id.
122. Pozen, supra note 10, at 574–87. Appendix D, infra, provides information about the types of
foreign charitable activities supported by U.S. nonprofit organizations.
123. Robin Burgess & Nicholas Stern, Taxation and Development, 31 J. of Econ. Literature 762,
764–66 (1993).
124. In many countries, however, simply providing additional funds to governments may not be a
good approach. Where government is inefficient and corrupt, smaller governments may be better.
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Mitchell Kane offers an interesting example that nicely highlights
125
some of these issues. Assume the U.S. and another country are
identical in every respect, including a currently underprovided public
good and the same absolute levels of individual utilities in both
126
countries. Assume also the benefits of the externalities from the public
127
good are enjoyed entirely locally. Should the U.S. tax its individual and
corporate taxpayers to provide the same level of public goods in both
128
countries?
As a matter of domestic tax policy, Kane argues that the answer is
129
clearly no. Despite calls by moral philosophers advocating greater
cosmopolitan responsibilities, tax and spending policies in the U.S. are
driven by the gains to its citizens and residents rather than to foreign
130
beneficiaries. We give greater weight to the utilities of our citizens and
131
residents and discount the utilities of foreigners. If we cannot justify
using general tax revenue to fund foreign charitable activities, we should
not use the charitable deduction as a means of providing public goods
outside the U.S. Kane thus finds a strong case for preferring tax benefits
132
for domestic rather than foreign charitable activities. Following this
logic, our tax system should give preference to donations made to
Harvard and the Metropolitan Opera over donations made to Oxford
University and the Royal Opera House.
Relaxing some of the assumptions of Kane’s example muddies the
water. Consider charitable transfers from U.S. donors to a U.S. charity
that provides support for victims of the Japanese earthquake and
tsunami. These transfers provide utility both to the foreign recipients of
the assistance and to the U.S. donors (and perhaps other U.S. individuals
who appreciate both the willingness of others to donate for these causes
and the use of matching federal funds for this particular purpose). It is
not clear that our tax system should prefer donations made to the
Metropolitan Opera over donations made to charities that help those less
fortunate, even if the direct beneficiaries are outside the U.S.
Changing the focus from subsidies based on market failure to
subsidies based on political failure helps little in deciding whether the
charitable deduction should be extended to foreign charitable activities.
It is not clear that the same considerations that may support allowing
donors to decide in the domestic context apply with the same force for
foreign charitable activity. Again, these theories are based on the notion
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Kane, supra note 39.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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that private charity responds better to differences in demand for
collective goods than does the government. This assumes broad
participation by a large group of donors supporting many different types
of activities. But it seems likely that allowing a charitable deduction for
contributions for foreign activities would concentrate disproportionate
influence among certain groups, such as supporters of Mormon
missionary activities, supporters of Israeli causes, and a handful of
wealthy donors.
Even if we decide as a matter of tax policy that the charitable
deduction should not be extended to foreign charitable activities, this
does not mean that there is no role for the government’s use of tax
133
benefits to support foreign charitable activities. Assume, for example,
that the U.S. government decides to provide $10 billion in funding in
2011 for humanitarian aid to Africa. We could choose to provide the $10
billion directly through direct foreign assistance funded out of general
tax revenue, or allow charitable deductions at a revenue cost of $10
billion to subsidize private assistance efforts in Africa. The question then
becomes which alternative (or combination of the two) yields the
greatest benefit—both in terms of choice of projects and the quality of
the outputs. For certain types of activities and projects, private providers
134
may have clear advantages over direct government foreign assistance.
Providing additional funds to the Gates Foundation’s efforts to combat
malaria in Africa may be more productive than providing financial
assistance to African governments to fund government-operated health
facilities or to projects selected and monitored by the U.S. government.
The existing charitable subsidy literature also fails to address several
issues that arise in cross-border philanthropy. For example, the leading
theory of government failure ties inadequate levels of collective goods
and services to the preferences of the majority trumping those interested
135
minorities with money to contribute. This theory assumes a single
136
society in which the voting, contributions, and subsidies take place.
Once charitable activities cross borders, the interests of other groups
should be part of the analysis. We sometimes assume that the recipients
of charity value whatever they receive and, if they do not want it, they
can simply turn it down.
But it often does not work that way. With charitable assistance
comes economic, social, and political influence. The Saudi Arabian
government has made contributions to the William J. Clinton
Foundation (as have the governments of Italy, Kuwait, Norway, and

133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 5.
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 102–08 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 102–08 and accompanying text.
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Qatar), the CITGO-Venezuela Heating Oil Program has donated
millions of gallons of crude oil to a U.S. charity that provides assistance
138
to needy homeowners, and a charity that may be linked to the Iranian
government donated $100,000 to Columbia University in advance of
139
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s speech in September 2007. While
the flow of charitable contributions into the U.S. is just a trickle, donorprovided assistance constitutes a large portion of many economies in
developing countries. Theories that simply look at the preferences of the
donors and the level of government subsidies, but not the preferences of
the recipients, likely will not be useful in examining issues related to
foreign charitable activities.
Similarly, U.S. scholars have generally adopted a U.S.-centric view
of government, the private sector, and the nonprofit sector. In this
relatively simple world, existing subsidy theories reflect that the goods
and services could be provided by any of these three actors. In
developing countries, the cast of characters is much larger. They include
such other players as multilateral institutions, foreign governments,
bilateral aid agencies, and foreign charities. Each has relative advantages
and disadvantages in providing development assistance. Again, richer
theories are required to incorporate the complexities of different
providers of assistance in determining the usefulness of tax subsidies for
charitable contributions for foreign activities.
Where does this leave us? We do not have a comprehensive theory
that supports the automatic extension of the existing charitablededuction regime for contributions to fund the domestic activities of
domestic charities to cover contributions to fund foreign charitable
activities. Merely showing that several of the existing theories provide no
clear basis for distinguishing between domestic and foreign charitable
activities is not sufficient to justify adopting a geographically neutral
policy. If we adopt the “take it or leave it” approach to the charitable
deduction, then we need to show that the trade-offs that balance the
costs and benefits of using tax dollars to subsidize domestic altruism
would result in a similar determination for foreign altruism—even
recognizing that the specific trade-offs in the domestic context will be
different in the foreign context. The “bang for the buck” approach would
perhaps support tax subsidies for foreign charitable activities, though not
necessarily in the same form that applies to purely domestic activities.

137. Philip Rucker, The Near, Far, Left—Even Right—Aided Clinton Group, Wash. Post, Jan. 2,
2010, at A2; Foreigners Gave Millions to Clinton Foundation, msnbc.com (Dec. 18, 2008),
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28295539#.
138. For a description of the program, see Program Overview, CITGO-Venezuela Heating Oil
Program, http://www.citgoheatingoil.com/program_overview.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2011).
139. A.G. Sulzberger, Foundation Tied to Iran Has Donated to Columbia, N.Y. Times, Nov. 24,
2009, at A30.
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There are several alternatives for differentiating between domestic
and foreign charitable activities. At one extreme, we could disallow
charitable deductions for amounts spent on foreign charitable activities.
Less severe restrictions include per-country limitations or allowing only a
certain percentage of amounts allocated to foreign charitable activities to
qualify for tax benefits. Finally, we could impose more restrictive
provisions as to the type of foreign activities that qualify for tax benefits,
recognizing that some activities provide benefits to a narrow group of
beneficiaries (support for the Royal Opera House in England) as
compared to a broader group of beneficiaries (support for disaster relief
efforts).

III. Should the Tax System Treat Foreign Charities
Differently from Domestic Charities?
If the decision is made to allow tax subsidies for foreign charitable
activities, then the question becomes which charities should provide such
goods and services. Should the tax law provide different tax treatment
based on the charity’s place of organization? While my focus here is on
the tax deductibility of charitable contributions to foreign and domestic
charities, the U.S. tax regime provides several other provisions that
disadvantage funding of foreign, as compared to domestic, charitable
140
activities.
A. General Considerations
With limited exceptions, the tax law adopts a “water’s-edge” policy
by allowing donors to deduct for income tax purposes only contributions
made to donees “created or organized in the United States or in any
possession thereof, or under the law of the United States, any State, the
141
District of Columbia, or any possession of the United States.”
The income tax regime initially allowed tax deductions for
142
contributions made to foreign charities. This “place-of-organization”

140. See generally Dale, supra note 22 (discussing the lack of tax-exempt status for foreign
charities). For example, tax law applies several “place of use” restrictions. Corporate donors may
generally not deduct charitable contributions unless the funds are used for domestic purposes.
However, this limitation applies only to recipients that are trusts or unincorporated associations; it
does not apply to corporate donees. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (2010). Thus, corporate donors can easily avoid
the place-of-use limitation by giving contributions to corporate donees. Private foundations must
satisfy additional requirements if they make grants to foreign, as opposed to domestic, organizations.
Private foundations must either make an equivalency determination or exercise expenditure
responsibility for foreign grant making in order to have foreign grants be counted toward minimum
distribution requirements and to avoid excise taxes on prohibited taxable distributions. I.R.C §§ 4942,
4945 (2010).
141. I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(A) (2010). The limitation applies even if the foreign charity qualifies for
tax-exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010).
142. Dale, supra note 18, at 660.
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restriction was adopted in 1938. Here is the often-cited passage in the
legislative history of the Revenue Act of 1938:
The exemption from taxation of money or property devoted to
charitable or other purposes is based upon the theory that the
Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from
financial burden which would otherwise have to be met by
appropriations from public funds, and by the benefits resulting from
the promotion of general welfare. The United States derives no such
benefit from gifts to foreign institutions, and the proposed limitation is
144
consistent with the above theory.

This limitation has been persuasively described as bad history, bad
145
philosophy, and bad logic. It is bad history because there was no
Congressional quid pro quo requirement that charitable activities relieve
146
the government of an expense before allowing deductibility. This
requirement would not be satisfied by many types of domestic activities
that qualify for tax benefits even though the government is not relieved
of obligations to provide similar good or services. Also, because of the
current level of private assistance for foreign charitable activities, the
U.S. government may be relieved of the burden of providing different
types of foreign aid. It is also bad philosophy, as even in the 1930s this
was a narrow view of the world in general and of global philanthropy in
147
148
particular. Finally, it is bad logic. It makes little sense to deny a
charitable deduction on the basis of where the entity is organized but to
allow charitable deductions to domestic entities that use some or all of
149
their funds outside the U.S.
At one level, the place-of-organization restriction merely increases
the transaction costs of providing funds for charitable activities outside
the U.S. Individuals can donate to public charities or private foundations
in order to structure their giving to avoid restrictions on direct
contributions to foreign charities. It is also easy for many established
foreign charities to create “friends of” organizations. These organizations
are established to allow U.S. contributors to make donations to a U.S.
entity that then transfers amounts to a specific charitable organization
150
outside the U.S. As long as the organization does not act as a mere

143. Id. (stating that the restriction was adopted in 1938 for individuals and in 1935 for corporations).
144. H.R. Rep. No. 75-1860, at 19 (1938).
145. Dale, supra note 18, at 660, 661.
146. Id. at 660–61.
147. Id. at 661.
148. Id.
149. Id. A domestic corporation’s “activities are charitable within the meaning of section 501(c)(3)
of the Code when carried on within the United States, the conduct of such activities elsewhere does
not preclude the organization from qualifying as an exempt organization under that section.” Rev.
Rul. 71-460, 1971-2 C.B. 231.
150. The “friends of” organizations must meet certain statutory requirements and must file annual
returns with the IRS. See Rev. Rul. 69-80, 1969-1 C.B. 65.
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conduit to the foreign charity, U.S. donors can secure deductions for
151
charitable contributions that are effectively made to foreign charities.
Internet platforms also allow for U.S. donors to choose foreign
beneficiaries by effectively using the public charity status of a charitable
intermediary. These platforms reduce transaction costs for individuals
seeking to fund foreign projects. For example, GlobalGiving provides
individuals with funding opportunities for education, health, and other
152
types of projects in different countries. While these organizations do
provide some oversight as to how funds are spent, because of their public
charity status they are not subject to the strict expenditure responsibilities
153
applicable to private foundations.
Assume for purposes of this discussion that there was no problem in
monitoring the activities of either domestic or foreign charities (or that
the proportion of charities behaving badly was the same), and assume
that it is already possible to give deductible donations to foreign
organizations, albeit with higher transaction costs. It seems that under
these assumptions, we would want those organizations that were the
most efficient providers of charitable services to receive tax subsidies.
There seems little reason for the U.S. tax system to favor less effective
U.S. charities over more effective foreign charities. We should want the
donations and the matching federal funds to go to the charities that
154
provide the highest quality assistance.
Strong arguments also exist for allowing U.S. donors to take
advantage of regulatory regimes that are more effective in approving and
monitoring charities than are the IRS and state attorneys general. The
United Kingdom’s Charity Commission likely provides more effective
oversight of U.K. charitable organizations than do U.S. oversight
155
mechanisms.
The strongest rationale for requiring a domestic entity as a passthrough for funds sent overseas is to increase accountability and
transparency. This allows the IRS and state governments to have some
oversight of the activities, even though the funds are spent outside the
U.S. If deductibility under Internal Revenue Code section 170 requires
the IRS to determine that the contributions are used exclusively for

151. See Rev. Rul. 74-229, 1974-1 C.B. 142.
152. See About Us, GlobalGiving, http://www.globalgiving.org/aboutus/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2011).
153. See supra note 65.
154. For example, Israeli charities provided assistance to Haiti by funding aid groups with
substantial experience in recovery and rescue efforts, medical assistance, and structural engineering.
Israeli and Jewish Aid Groups Provide Relief to Haiti, Israel Project, http://www.theisraelproject.org/
site/apps/nlnet/content3.aspx?c=asIOI5NJKeK0F&b=7676971&ct=11139149#.Tp5Zgs3oIzw (last visited
Dec. 23, 2011). Under current law, U.S. donors would not be allowed to deduct amounts contributed
to Israeli charities even though these charities may be the most effective aid providers.
155. Kevin E. Davis & Anna Gelpern, Peer-to-Peer Financing for Development: Regulating the
Intermediaries, 42 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 1209, 1261–63 (2010).
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charitable purposes and that no part of the earnings inure to the benefit
of any private individual, it is important to have a U.S. intermediary,
especially where the IRS lacks the ability and authority to audit activities
156
outside the U.S.
Oversight concerns take on added importance in the postSeptember 11, 2001 world. The use of charitable organizations to support
terrorist activities makes the cost of abuses related to foreign charitable
activities greater than just wasted U.S. tax dollars. While requiring
foreign charities to use a U.S.-based intermediary may not be entirely
effective in limiting the flow of funds to terrorist organizations, it
157
potentially provides some help in limiting such abuses.
If we wish to extend tax benefits to foreign charities, then there are
several alternatives that may facilitate donations while minimizing
158
chances of abuse. First, foreign charities could apply for the right to
receive tax-deductible contributions in the same way they can currently
apply for tax-exempt status, just as foreign publicly held corporations are
required to comply with certain disclosure and other requirements to
159
have their stock listed on national stock exchanges. Second, we could
adopt an “approved foreign charity list” of those foreign charities that
satisfy certain criteria based on a review by the IRS or the State
Department, or some other agency. This approach shares much in
common with the current Canadian system, in which individual taxpayers
are allowed to deduct contributions to foreign charities as long as the
160
Canadian government also has contributed to those charities. Third,
the existing tax-treaty network could be used to provide for deductibility
of contributions to foreign charities on a country-by-country basis.
Currently, the U.S. provides treaty relief for U.S. residents, generally
allowing them to reduce their foreign-source income through donations
161
to charities in Canada, Israel, and Mexico. Finally, we could adopt a
156. See Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Charitable Contributions: A Policy Perspective, 50 Mo. L. Rev. 85,
103 (1985).
157. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t. of the Treasury, Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary
Best Practices for U.S.-Based Charities (2002) (suggesting charities use governing instruments,
independent oversight, publication of key employees, and records to account for disbursements,
among other suggestions to help ensure donations are directed towards charitable purposes).
158. Pozen, supra note 10, at 594–96.
159. Foreign charities currently can apply for tax-exempt status in the U.S. to qualify for certain
federal, state, and local tax benefits.
160. See Can. Revenue Agency, No. IC84-3R6, Gifts to Certain Charitable Organizations
Outside Canada (2010).
161. Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of the United Mexican States for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Mex. art. 22, Sept. 18, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-7
(1993); Convention with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, U.S.-Can. art. XX, Sept. 26,
1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,087; Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of the State of Israel with Respect to Taxes on Income, U.S.-Isr. art. 23, 25, Nov. 20,
1975, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-7 (1981). If this alternative is adopted, then the benefits could be
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“substantial equivalent” approach, where charities in those countries
whose charitable regulations meet some minimum guidelines would be
eligible to receive deductible contributions.
B. Consequences of Extending Tax Benefits to Foreign Charitable
Activities
There are three major consequences of extending greater tax
benefits to foreign charitable activities, whether in the form of less
restrictive rules for domestic charities engaged in development assistance
or allowing deductions for contributions made directly to foreign
charities: (1) the potential effects on the quality and quantity of goods
and services provided, (2) the interaction with other providers of
development assistance, and (3) the substitution away from support to
domestic charities.
1. Effects on Quality and Quantity
The desirability of extending tax benefits to foreign charitable
activities depends largely on the effectiveness of foreign charities in
providing assistance as compared to other alternatives. A key question is
how, and how much, charities will improve the quality and quantity of
collective goods and services in the countries in which they operate, if a
deduction were allowed. The alternatives include not only increasing the
tax benefits allocable to domestic charitable activities, but also increased
government support for official development assistance (either directly
or through grants to charities and other providers), multilateral
organizations, or simply lower taxes.
It is likely that U.S. and foreign charities will act differently from
162
To the extent that U.S.
governments or multilateral agencies.
government aid policy is strongly influenced by foreign policy concerns,
there is a greater role for tax subsidies for foreign charitable activities.
In examining the potential gains from increased tax benefits, I offer
a few observations. First, the private sector may be more effective in
providing certain types of goods and services than are U.S. government
programs (either directly provided or funded and supervised by the
United States Agency for International Development (“USAID”)).
Perhaps we subsidize charitable contributions not as a matter of tax
163
policy, but rather as a means of achieving public goals. Subsidized
expanded by relaxing limitations with respect to foreign-source income.
162. Raj M. Desai & Homi Kharas, Do Philanthropic Citizens Behave Like Governments? 1
(Wolfensohn Ctr. for Dev. at Brookings, Working Paper No. 12, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1492214.
163. Schizer, supra note 41, at 255–58. While David Schizer’s focus is primarily on the U.S.
nonprofit sector, much of his discussion of recruiting nongovernment donors to monitor the quality of
nonprofit organizations applies with equal or perhaps even greater force to foreign activities.
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charities represent one of many tools available to governments. We
could then justify the charitable tax deduction in part because it provides
incentives for donors to monitor the quality of nonprofit organizations.
The Gates Foundation has substantial resources and financial and
reputational incentives to monitor the activities of its health-care
programs in Africa, and the benefits may be greater than those provided
164
by similar U.S. government programs.
Second, foreign charities may have advantages based on access to
information, lower operating expenses due to proximity, and greater
knowledge of local challenges than U.S.-based charities. Apart from
compliance and enforcement concerns, tax subsidies should support
those organizations that are the most efficient providers of goods and
services. Expanding the pool of eligible recipients of tax-deductible
contributions to foreign charities likely will yield additional benefits from
the support of the development of a nonprofit sector in developing
countries.
Third, private U.S. donors, domestic charities, and foreign charities
may be better able to deal with political challenges as well as corruption
issues in developing countries than can the U.S. government, World
Bank, or other government or quasi-government providers. Charities
operating in many countries face similar challenges due to political
pressures or corrupt officials, but the consequences of confronting these
pressures or corruption are very different for private actors than for
government providers that may have a larger and more complex agenda
in these countries.
2. Interaction with Other Providers
One consequence of increasing tax benefits for foreign charitable
activities is that U.S. donors may play a greater role in foreign charitable
activities. In the domestic context, the nonprofit sector can play a
supplementary role, a complementary role, or an adversarial role with
165
respect to the U.S. government. This same framework could apply in
the international environment, by expanding the frame of reference to
include multiple governments as well as international institutions. Thus,
for example, the interaction could be supplementary, whereby U.S.
donors could fulfill directly (or provide additional support to foreign
charities that fulfill) the demand for public goods that is not completely
satisfied by the local government, other foreign governments, or other
international institutions. The interaction could also be complementary
in that U.S. donors could coordinate with other aid providers to increase
164. See Global Health Program, Bill & Melinda Gates Found., http://www.gatesfoundation.org/
global-health/Pages/overview.aspx (last visited Dec. 23, 2011).
165. Dennis R. Young, Complementary, Supplementary, or Adversarial? Nonprofit-Government
Relations, in Nonprofit & Government, supra note 18, at 37.
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the effectiveness of the assistance. The gains from decentralization of
charitable activities are increased diversity and innovation. The cost is
the lack of coordination either among other donors or with government
agencies. Finally, the interaction could be adversarial in that U.S. donors
could challenge either the policy of the U.S. or foreign governments or of
international agencies. Nongovernmental organizations may face special
challenges where their beliefs and preferences differ from those held by
166
U.S. agencies or other providers of funding. U.S. government or local
governments could also try to influence the behavior of nonprofits
through regulation or other institutional responses.
3. Substitution Away from Domestic Charities
While extending tax benefits to foreign charitable activities may
increase total contributions from U.S. donors, these changes may result
in substitution away from U.S. charities, particularly U.S. charities
engaged in foreign activities. It is difficult to estimate the amount of
substitution, but one would expect some substitution away from domestic
to international activities. It is also difficult to measure whether there will
be a substitution effect away from U.S. charities engaged in foreign
activities to foreign charities.

IV. Should the Tax System Extend Tax Benefits to For-Profit
Entities Engaged in Charitable Activities, Including
Foreign For-Profit Entities?
So far, this Article has addressed issues related to the domicile of
the charitable organization, but it is also important to focus on the
charity’s corporate structure. Historically, tax law generally adopted a
binary approach to for-profit and nonprofit organizations, with for-profit
organizations subject to income tax and only nonprofit organizations
qualifying for tax-exempt status and receiving tax-deductible
contributions. In recent years, however, there has been a substantial
increase in entities that blur the traditional boundaries between forprofit and nonprofit entities. Two trends are clear: nonprofit
organizations are adopting more profit-oriented approaches, and some
for-profit organizations are adopting charitable missions. Joint ventures
between for-profit and nonprofit organizations are becoming more
167
common and raise important governance and transparency issues.
The label “for-profit charities” covers many different types of
entities. Depending on the context, for-profit charities could include
charities that look and operate a lot like for-profit entities, such as
166. Janelle A. Kerlin, U.S.-Based International NGOs and Federal Government Foreign
Assistance: Out of Alignment?, in Nonprofit & Government, supra note 18, at 373.
167. Sarah Dadush, Profiting in (RED): The Need for Enhanced Transparency in Cause-Related
Marketing, 42 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 1269, 1312–19 (2010).
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hospitals, museums, and symphony orchestras, or the “related” activities
such as universities operating bookstores, conference facilities, or
basketball or football teams. It also could include the for-profit
subsidiaries of tax-exempt entities. Particularly in the health-care field, it
is common for nonprofit organizations to have for-profit subsidiaries and
168
for nonprofit entities to convert to for-profit status. Finally, there are
for-profit companies that engage in activities that are similar to the
169
charitable activities of tax-exempt charities. It is this last type of entity
170
that has been the subject of recent academic scholarship.
Domestically, scholars have proposed allowing donors to make taxdeductible contributions to for-profit entities engaged in charitable
activities and have considered alternatives for increasing the role of for171
profit entities in charitable activities. Should we, or can we, apply this
analysis to the role of foreign charities?
A. Tax Benefits for For-Profit Charities
The most influential examination of charitable activities by forprofit entities is Anup Malani and Eric Posner’s case for granting
172
nonprofit charitable organization tax treatment to for-profit charities.
Ultimately, though, their conclusions assume a consistent rationale for
the deductibility of charitable donations, and, as we have seen, that
173
internal consistency may be lacking. Like other scholars, Malani and
Posner note that the level of desirable collective goods is less than
socially optimal and that government subsidies may be necessary to
174
increase the level of production of these desirable goods and services.
Malani and Posner argue that if our objective is to increase the level of
these goods and services, then nonprofit organizations are not the only,
175
or even the best, game in town. As discussed below, similar arguments
may support extending charitable deductions for foreign charities and,
perhaps, other foreign organizations engaged in charitable activities.
Malani and Posner nicely frame the question as one of “linkage” or
“coupling”—why is a particular tax benefit designed to promote

168. James J. Fishman, Checkpoints on the Conversion Highway: Some Trouble Spots in the
Conversion of Nonprofit Health Care Organizations to For-Profit Status, 23 Iowa J. Corp. L. 701, 708
(1998).
169. Malani & Posner, supra note 30, at 2019–20; see, e.g., Google.org, http://www.google.org/
(last visited Dec. 23, 2011) (website for Google, Inc.’s for-profit entity with philanthropic goals).
170. E.g., Brian Galle, Keep Charity Charitable, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 1213 (2010); Hines et al., supra
note 113; Malani & Posner, supra note 30.
171. Malani & Posner, supra note 30, at 2029–30.
172. Id. at 2019.
173. See supra notes 100–121 and accompanying text.
174. Malani & Posner, supra note 30, at 2030.
175. Id. at 2055 (“An underlying theme of this Essay is that nonprofit firms are less efficient than
for-profit firms . . . .”).
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charitable activities conditioned on a particular corporate form? To
answer that question, they examine several leading theories, two of
which are discussed below, for why government support of charitable
activities is necessary and desirable. They contend that decoupling would
yield greater and more efficient production of these essential collective
177
These gains would come from increased
goods and services.
competition for charitable donations between for-profit and nonprofit
charities, from improvement in operating efficiencies for nonprofit
charities through better incentives for managers and incentives for
minimizing costs, and from “economies of scope” achieved by allowing
for-profit charities to achieve gains and scale efficiencies from the
178
noncharitable activities of the organization.
Malani and Posner begin with the “public good” theory for
government support for voluntary contributions to increase the level of
179
collective goods and services. Their insight is that what is important is
the end result (higher levels of collective goods and services), not the
180
means of getting there (who actually provides the goods and services).
Allowing for-profit charities to receive tax-deductible contributions may
also further the goal of decentralization of decisionmaking, as more and
different entities will engage in the charitable activities.
Similarly, Malani and Posner respond to the “agency” theory that
the nondistribution constraint for the nonprofit form provides comfort to
181
donors that funds will be used exclusively for charitable purposes.
Malani and Posner consider the costs and benefits of imposing a
182
nondistribution constraint. They note that parties could use contract
law to simulate the nondistribution constraint for all or part of profits
183
from activities. In addition, private parties could certify that for-profit
184
charities comply with any nondistribution requirement. They thus
conclude that the agency theory does not provide an adequate basis for
185
distinguishing between nonprofit and for-profit charities.
Malani and Posner’s call for tax subsidies for for-profit charities has
drawn much criticism, on a variety of grounds. There are serious
concerns at each step. Any efficiency gains made by virtue of for-profit
176. Id. at 2021. Bill Klein and I adopted a similar approach in questioning why limited-liability
status and favorable tax regimes were linked to a particular corporate form. William A. Klein & Eric
M. Zolt, Business Form, Limited Liability, and Tax Regimes: Lurching Toward a Coherent Outcome?,
66 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1001, 1007 (1995).
177. Malani & Posner, supra note 30, at 2055.
178. Id. at 2027, 2056, 2063.
179. Id. at 2047–51.
180. Id. at 2049.
181. Id. at 2031–41.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 2036.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 2029.
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status would be undermined by the costs of monitoring and
186
enforcement, and decoupling tax subsidies from the nonprofit form
187
creates new opportunities for tax arbitrage. Particularly challenging is
the application of the current vague criteria for eligible charitable
activities of currently tax-exempt entities to for-profit entities engaging in
188
a wide range of activities.
I agree with most of these criticisms, but my take is different. I
challenge the framing of Malani and Posner’s argument. They make a
persuasive case that existing theories (as well as their additional theories)
do not provide adequate rationales for denying tax benefits to for-profit
189
charities. But where does this take us?
Here is one way to frame their argument: (1) The leading existing
theories for allowing tax-deductible charitable contributions are A, B,
and C; (2) theories A, B, and C do not distinguish based on for-profit and
nonprofit forms of organization; (3) therefore, the leading theories do
not provide a basis for distinguishing between for-profit and nonprofit
charitable organizations; and (4) therefore, we should allow deductions
for contributions made to for-profit charities.
I agree that existing theories of subsidizing charitable activities do
not provide a clear basis for distinguishing tax-favored status based on
form of organization. Accepting this failure, there are at least two
possible outcomes. One, adopted by Malani and Posner, is that we
should allow both nonprofit and for-profit organizations to qualify for
190
tax subsidies as long as they are engaged in charitable activities. This
accepts 1 and 2 as true and provides support for conclusions 3 and 4.
But another conclusion is acknowledging that existing theories of
subsidizing charities are inadequate. At one level this is not surprising.
Existing theories are not particularly helpful in deciding which types of
activities deserve charitable support or whether domestic altruism should
rule over foreign altruism. So even though logically 1 and 2 are true and
support the conclusion in 3, it does not necessarily follow that conclusion
4 is valid.
B. For-Profit Charities and Foreign Charitable Activities
Many similarities exist between providing charitable tax benefits to
for-profit charities and providing charitable tax benefits to foreign
charities. The gains are similar. Why constrain donors’ choices? If the
goal is to increase levels of underprovided goods and services, we should
not limit the options available to those willing to fund these activities. By
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Galle, supra, note 170, at 1233.
Hines et al., supra note 113, at 1214–15.
Schizer, supra note 41, at 254–55.
Malani & Posner, supra note 30, at 2029.
Id. at 2065.
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increasing the pool of potential providers of collective goods and
services, we should increase both the quality and quantity of these goods
and services. As discussed earlier, foreign charities may bring expertise
and perspective to challenges in their countries that will be different and
perhaps better than those provided by U.S. charities, even those U.S.
charities that rely on local organizations to help design and administer
their programs.
The challenges are also quite similar. Because of challenges in
enforcement, it may be necessary to define more strictly the class of
191
eligible activities (and perhaps eligible recipients). There would be a
trade-off between greater diversity in activities and a greater opportunity
for abuse.
The for-profit charity debate provides an opportunity to think about
alternatives to encourage charitable activity other than the current form
of the charitable tax deduction. The charitable tax deduction is not the
only tool for government to increase the role of the private sector in
charitable activities. Other government programs or tax subsidies can
increase private sector participation in charitable activities. These types
of government subsidies avoid some of the challenges of extending tax
deductibility for contributions to for-profit charities, but may invoke a
different set of challenges and opportunities.
One alternative is to increase the level of government grants and
contracts to for-profit firms to perform charitable activities. Since the
1970s, USAID, the government’s foreign aid agency, has changed its
approach from providing goods and services directly to using third-party
192
contractors to provide foreign assistance. These contractors are both
for-profit and nonprofit organizations. To the extent that USAID is
successful in monitoring contractors and evaluating performance, one
would expect the more efficient providers to succeed, especially given
the repeat nature of these contractual arrangements. These government
grants and contracts could also provide direct support for foreign
charities or for-profit groups or require U.S.-based providers to partner
with local providers.
While this approach provides for monitoring activities of the forprofit providers, it also restricts the types of programs subsidized to those
chosen by USAID or other government agencies. The distribution of
government funds under this arrangement will reflect political and other
priorities that may or may not match the set of charitable objectives
preferred by society at large. In other areas, such as basic scientific
191. The current list of permitted charitable activities (as well as the regulatory regime) was adopted
by Congress with an explicit “no private inurement” requirement. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)(c)(2) (2010). It is interesting to think about what permitted activities and what regulatory regime would
make sense if we allowed for-profit entities to qualify for charitable tax benefits.
192. Kerlin, supra note 166, at 375.
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research or the promotion of the arts, Congress has, with varying success,
established quasi-independent boards to select and monitor recipients of
government funds. Boards such as the National Science Foundation or
the National Endowment for the Arts seek to provide funding to those
organizations that will yield the greatest benefits (according to proposed
mission) with, one hopes, minimal interference from the political process.
One could imagine a similar board with responsibility for allocating
funds to address issues tied to foreign charitable activities with the class
of potential recipients broad enough to include foreign charities and forprofit firms, as well as domestic charities.
Finally, Congress has traditionally supported charitable activities by
providing subsidies to the tax-exempt entities engaged in charitable
activity. An alternative approach would provide tax subsidies to support
activities rather than entities. For example, Congress could provide
refundable targeted tax credits for specific activities related to foreign
charitable activities. Targeted tax credits are used for a variety of
purposes, including increasing research and development, development
193
of orphan drugs, and alternative energy sources. Similar tax credits
could be designed to provide incentives for U.S. for-profit organizations
to engage in specific types of charitable activities. Malani and Posner
offer a variation of this approach, which combines targeted charitable
194
activities and the charitable deduction. Their plan would allow donors
to make tax-deductible contributions for a particular charitable activity
(but not to a charitable organization), but have the government choose
195
the particular organization that would receive funding. This alternative
would provide policymakers with information about donor preferences
without coupling the receipt of donated funds to nonprofit status.

Conclusion
This Article examines the tax regime governing charitable deductions
for foreign assistance both to determine how the regime should be
changed and also to see what insights might emerge on the desirability of
using the tax system to subsidize charitable activities. The current tax
regime generally allows U.S. taxpayers to deduct contributions to
domestic charities with foreign activities but not to foreign charities and
not to for-profit charities, including those engaged in charitable activities
outside the U.S. These decisions cannot easily be reconciled. The
challenges begin because of limitations in the basic theories justifying tax
benefits for charitable activities. The challenges may be even greater
when charitable assistance crosses national boundaries. Perhaps donors

193. I.R.C. §§ 41, 45C, 48C (2010).
194. Malani & Posner, supra note 30, at 2052.
195. Id.
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should not be allowed to decide without limitations how matching funds
are provided for foreign charitable assistance. The donor-focused
theories offer little or no guidance as to which charitable activities merit
support, or whether to impose geographical limitations on either the use
of the donation or the location of the charitable organization. Theories
based on market failures may yield different conclusions depending on
the type of charitable activity and the extent of market failure in a given
geographical area. For those activities where most of the benefits accrue
to foreign persons, perhaps the gains from a U.S. perspective of using the
tax system to fund these activities are not worth the lost tax revenue. For
theories based on political failures, it is not clear that the same
considerations that allow donors to dictate in the domestic context apply
to choices made with respect to foreign charitable activity. It may be that
a different type of matching program that better targets federal funds to
specific types of activities and to specific countries would yield a more
effective and more representative subsidy program than that achieved
under current tax law.
These theories justifying tax benefits for charitable activities are also
flawed in their failure to address issues that arise in cross-border
philanthropy. For example, the subsidy theories for charitable
contributions assume a simple three-sector model of a government, a
private sector, and a nonprofit sector and a single society in which voting,
contributions, and subsidies take place. These theories do not reflect
either the preferences of the recipient country or its citizens or the role of
other multilateral institutions, foreign governments, bilateral aid
agencies, and other foreign charities in providing assistance. It may be
that there is an optimal amount of tax subsidy for foreign charitable
activities, and that amount would vary over time given other programs’
needs, government aid policies, and revenue constraints. But perhaps the
government, and not private donors, should determine the level of public
foreign assistance.
The question of the relative tax treatment of foreign charities and
domestic charities may be the easiest to answer. If we want to continue to
encourage foreign charitable activity, the objective should be to provide
tax subsidies to those charities that could provide the highest quality
goods and services at the lowest costs. It seems likely that for some types
of activities, U.S.-based charities would have comparative advantages in
providing these goods and services. But for other types of activities, such
as disaster relief for victims of the Japanese earthquake, foreign charities
likely have a better understanding of needs and challenges in their home
countries, better access to information, and lower operating costs. In
196
many cases, a combination approach may be best. It is thus hard to

196. Recent efforts at reducing the costs and obligations of U.S. foundations in making grants to
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rationalize the current prohibition against tax deductions for direct
contributions to foreign charities, for at least two reasons. First, the
compliance and enforcement challenges of allowing deductions for
contributions to foreign charities can be addressed by such measures as
the IRS maintaining an “approved foreign charity” list or by adopting a
“substantial equivalent” approach, whereby charities in those countries
whose charitable regulations meet some minimum guidelines would
qualify to receive tax-deductible contributions. Second, it is hard to
justify such a prohibition and at the same time allow easy (but not
costless) avoidance of the restrictions through either a “friends of”
organization structure that allows several foreign charities access to U.S.
tax subsidies or through donors establishing private foundations to direct
foreign assistance.
Whether to extend tax benefits to for-profit entities engaged in
charitable activities is a harder question to answer. Extending tax
subsidies to for-profit charities presents many opportunities for gain or
abuse similar to those presented by extending tax subsidies to foreign
charities. Merely because several of the existing theories justifying the
charitable deduction provide no clear basis for distinguishing between
nonprofit and for-profit charities, it does not follow that a strong case
exists for allowing tax deduction for contributions to for-profit charities.
Nor do I believe that the similarities between foreign charities and forprofit charities mean that the policy responses are necessarily the same.
Finally, the challenges in designing a sensible regime for foreign
charitable assistance highlight many of the weaknesses of the current
charitable deduction regime applicable to domestic charitable activities.
Two unrelated recent events bring the charitable deduction into greater
focus: the billionaires’ pledge, which will generate substantial funds for
charitable activities, and the recent tax reform proposals that call for the
repeal of many personal deductions and for changing the current tax
regime for charitable contributions. At a general level, these events
present squarely the “take it or leave it” approach to the charitable
deduction. If we provide matching funds to support the billionaires’
choices of which charities merit federal funds, we recognize the benefits
and costs of the current regime and conclude that the benefits from the
additional funds (as well as the benefits from engaging these donors in
these charitable activities) outweigh the lost tax revenue and other costs
that result from allowing donors to dictate how matching federal funds
are spent. If we simply repeal the charitable deduction, we lose the
incremental gains that result from the federal tax subsidy for charitable
contributions and regain public control of public funds.

foreign charities are helpful in providing charitable services and supporting these foreign charities.
Advisory Comm. on Tax Exempt & Gov’t Entities, supra note 82, at 6.
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The “bang for the buck” approach may present a compromise to the
extremes set forth above. It recognizes that the current regime for
charitable deductions creates value, but perhaps not enough value for its
costs, broadly defined. In thinking about changes to the current
charitable deduction regime, many of the alternatives that arise in the
context of designing government subsidies, including tax benefits, for
foreign charitable assistance warrant examination not just abroad but in
the domestic context as well. We should give serious consideration to
narrowing the definition of charity for the purposes of the tax deduction
(and perhaps for tax-exempt status), creating matching grant programs
different than those inherent in the current charitable deduction,
matching deductions for specific activities rather than entities, and
designing better procedures for approving tax-exempt status and
monitoring activities. Charity may begin at home—but perhaps clear
thinking about it begins abroad.
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Appendix A: Individuals Signing the Giving
Pledge and
197
Estimates of Current Wealth
Last Name(s)

First Name(s)

Age(s)

Allen
Arnold
Berggruen
Bloomberg
Broad
Buffett
Case
Chan & Soon-Shiong
Cooperman
Cummings
Dalio
DeJoria
Diller & Von Furstenberg
Doerr
Ellison
Feeney
Forstmann
Frost
Gates
Green
Greene
Hamm
Hill
Hilton
Huntsman
Icahn
Jacobs
Kaiser
Khosla
Kimmel
Kinder
Langone

Paul
Laura & John
Nicolas
Michael
Eli & Edythe
Warren
Jean & Steve
Michele & Patrick
Lee & Toby
Joyce & Bill
Ray & Barbara
John Paul
Barry & Diane
Ann & John
Larry
Charles
Ted
Phillip & Patricia
Bill & Melinda
David & Barbara
Jeff
Harold & Sue Ann
Lyda
Barron
Jon & Karen
Carl
Joan & Irwin
George
Vinod & Neeru
Sidney
Rich & Nancy
Elaine & Ken
Gerry &
Marguerite
Lorry
George
Duncan & Nancy
Alfred
Joe & Rika
Bernie & Billi
Michael & Lori

58
37
49
69
77 & 74
80
52 & 53
59
67
*
62
67
69 & 64
59
66
*
71
74
55 & 47
69
56
65
*
83
*
75
77
68
56
83
66
75

Net Worth (in
billions)
$12.7
$3.3
$2.2
$18.0
$5.8
$45.0
$1.1
$5.6
$1.5
*
$6.0
$4.2
$1.2
$1.6
$27.0
*
$1.6
$2.3
$54.0
$2.6
$1.8
$8.6
*
$2.5
*
$11.0
$1.1
$9.4
$1.4
$1.1
$7.4
$1.1

*

*

*
66
*
85
54
81
64

*
$3.3
*
$1.2
$1.2
$1.5
$2.1

Lenfest
Lokey
Lucas
MacMillan
Mann
Mansueto
Marcus
Milken

197. The Giving Pledge, http://www.thegivingpledge.org/#enter (last visited Dec. 23, 2011); The
World’s Billionaires, Forbes.com (Mar. 9, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/wealth/billionaires/list.
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Last Name(s)

First Name(s)

Mitchell
Monaghan
Morgridge
Moskovitz
Omidyar
Osher
Perelman
Peterson
Pickens
Robertson, Jr.
Rockefeller
Rose
Rubenstein
Sandler
Sanford
Sant
Schusterman
Scott, Jr.
Secunda
Simmons
Simons
Skoll
Steyer & Taylor
Stowers
Turner
Weill
White
Zegar
Zuckerberg

George
Thomas
Tashia & John
Dustin
Pierre & Pam
Bernard & Barbro
Ronald
Peter
T. Boone
Julian
David
Edward & Deedie
David
Herb & Marion
Denny
Vicki & Roger
Lynn
Walter
Tom & Cindy
Annette & Harold
Jim & Marilyn
Jeff
Tom & Kat
Jim & Virginia
Ted
Sanford & Joan
Shelby
Charles & Merryl
Mark

* indicates information not available

Age(s)
91
*
77
26
44
*
68
84
82
79
95
*
61
*
*
*
72
79
56
80
72
*
*
*
72
*
*
*
26

[Vol. 63:361

Net Worth (in
billions)
$2.0
*
$1.3
$1.4
$5.5
*
$11.0
$2.0
$1.4
$2.2
$2.2
*
$2.0
*
*
*
$2.0
$1.9
$1.0
$5.7
$8.7
*
*
*
$1.9
*
*
*
$6.9
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Appendix B: Household Giving by Subsector of Income and
198
Charity Type ($ in Billions)

Charity Type
Help Meet
Household Income Religious Combined Basic Needs Health Education Arts Other Total
<$100,000
59.96
7.70
9.34
3.06
2.69
1.01 6.16
89.92
$100,000 to $200,000
11.39
2.16
2.46
1.12
1.14
0.44 1.17
19.88
$200,000 to $1 million
21.01
10.19
5.30
4.81
29.15 13.57 7.45
91.48
$1 million or more
8.64
2.06
1.93
12.97
12.94
7.88 4.85
51.27
Total
101.00
22.11
19.03
21.96
45.92 22.90 19.63 252.55

198. Center on Philanthropy at Ind. U., supra note 53, at 12.

Zolt_63-HLJ-361 (Do Not Delete)

408

12/18/2011 8:31 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:361

Appendix C: Distribution of U.S. Nonprofit
Charitable
199
Assistance Efforts by Region

Western Europe, Canada, Australia,
New Zealand, Japan
Global (more than one region)
Latin America and the Caribbean
South and East Asia and the Pacific
Sub-Saharan Africa
Central Europe and Central Asia
The Middle East and North Africa

3%
29%
24%
15%
11%
10%
8%

199. Janelle A. Kerlin & Supaporn Thanasombat, The International Charitable Nonprofit Subsector:
Scope, Size, and Revenue, Nonprofits in Focus, Sept. 2006, at 1, 5 (using 2003 data).
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Appendix D: Types of Foreign Charitable Activities
Supported by
200
U.S. Nonprofit Organizations
Type of Nonprofit

Number

% of total int'l
nonprofits

Total
revenue ($)

% of total
revenue

International development and assistance
General
866

15%

2,770,563,787

15.65%

65

1%

202,131,615

1.14%

200
1,200
491
738
53

4%
21%
9%
13%
1%

383,579,680
6,412,788,171
791,543,584
2,455,202,841
46,948,625

2.17%
36.23%
4.47%
13.87%
0.27%

93

2%

251,277,539

1.42%

209

4%

1,483,349,607

8.38%

212

4%

941,816,849

5.32%

4,127

74%

15,739,202,298

88.92%

General

342

6%

349,814,542

1.98%

International cultural exchange
International academic and student
exchange
International exchanges N.E.C.

120

2%

56,155,559

0.32%

263

5%

561,544,247

3.17%

161

3%

136,662,235

0.77%

International understanding subtotal

886

16%

1,104,176,583

6.24%

General

165

3%

151,034,905

0.85%

Peace and arms control

205
103

4%
2%

122,172,999
486,660,673

0.69%
2.75%

37

1%

44,019,940

0.25%

75

1%

52,795,144

0.30%

585

10%

856,683,661

4.84%

5,598

100%

17,700,062,542

100.00%

Agricultural development
Economic development
International relief
Educational development
Health development
Science and technology development
Democracy and civil society
development
Environment, population, and
sustainability
Human rights, migration, and
refugees
International development and
assistance subtotal

International understanding

International affairs

International affairs education
National security
International economic and trade
policy
International affairs subtotal

Total international nonprofits

200. Id. at 2 (using 2003 data).
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